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OFFICER ACCOUNTABILITY 
Megan Wischmeier Shaner* 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The officer is at the center of modern corporate governance. 
Wielding immense power and influence, officers’ conduct and 
decision-making can determine the success or failure of their 
companies and impact the economy more broadly. Fiduciary duties 
under state law serve as a vital check on officer power. This article is 
the third piece in a study of the role of fiduciary duties in regulating 
officer behavior. It examines an underlying premise in prior 
scholarship – that officers are rarely being held accountable for their 
conduct in the traditional fiduciary duty litigation context of state 
court. This article reviews opinions of the Delaware state courts 
between 2004 and 2014 to gain insight into officers’ fiduciary 
accountability in this context. The results of this research suggest a 
modest occurrence of officer accountability in state court, consistent 
with prior scholars’ views. The court opinions also support other 
beliefs surrounding officer misconduct and the enforcement process 
for officers’ fiduciary duties. This article concludes with a discussion 
of long-term considerations for future research regarding the role of 
litigation in shaping officer accountability and fiduciary duty 
doctrine. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“The separation of control from ownership [in the corporate form] 
demands a system of accountability.”1 This statement is arguably 
truer now than ever before as today’s corporate icons like Warren 
Buffett, Mark Zuckerberg, and Marissa Mayer wield tremendous 
power and influence in running corporate America. Indeed, decisions 
made by these individuals can result in the success or collapse of 
their companies—and in some cases may even impact the broader 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Donald E. Schwartz, In Praise of Derivative Suits: A Commentary on the Paper of Professors 
Fischel and Bradley, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 322, 324 (1986). 
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economy. This power is not unfettered, however. At a minimum, it is 
subject to oversight by the board of directors and, perhaps more 
importantly, cabined within the limits of corporate fiduciary duties 
under state law.2 This article is the third piece in a three-part study of 
the role and effectiveness of fiduciary duties in regulating officer 
behavior.3 The first article explored the substantive content of an 
officer’s fiduciary duties4 while the second article analyzed the legal 
schemes in place to enforce those duties.5 Building upon this prior 
research, this article engages in an analysis of officers’ accountability 
in the traditional fiduciary duty litigation context of state court. 
A hallmark of the corporate form is the separation of ownership 
and management rights.6 Directors and, most often through 
directorial delegation, officers are given primary responsibility and 
decision-making powers regarding the business and affairs of the 
corporate enterprise,7 while stockholders, as the owners of and 
residual claimants to the assets of the entity, have few management 
                                                                                                                 
 2. See infra note 22. 
 3. See Megan Wischmeier Shaner, Restoring the Balance of Power in Corporate Management: 
Enforcing an Officer’s Duty of Obedience, 66 BUS. LAW. 27, 31 (2010) [hereinafter Restoring the 
Balance] (discussing the standards of fiduciary conduct for officers and proposing the duty of obedience 
to apply to these individuals); Megan W. Shaner, The (Un)Enforcement of Corporate Officers’ Duties, 
48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 271, 280 (2014) [hereinafter The (Un)Enforcement] (analyzing the enforcement 
scheme surrounding officer fiduciary duties). For purposes of this article, the term “corporate officer” or 
“officer” refers to non-director officers or persons who serve as both a director and an officer in the 
corporation but are acting in their officer capacity. Within this group, this article focuses primarily on 
senior/executive officers. 
 4. See Shaner, Restoring the Balance, supra note 3. 
 5. See Shaner, The (Un)Enforcement, supra note 3. 
 6. See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY 6–7 (Transaction Publishers 1991) (1932); CORP. GOVERNANCE COMM., AM. BAR ASS’N, 
REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE OF THE ABA SECTION OF BUSINESS LAW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
COMMITTEE ON DELINEATION OF GOVERNANCE ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES, 65 BUS. LAW. 107, 111 
(2009) [hereinafter ABA REPORT] (“The corporate form is defined by the way it distributes decision 
rights and responsibilities among shareholders, the board, and management.”). 
 7. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2006) (“The business and affairs of every 
corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors . . . .”); MODEL BUS. 
CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (2006) (“All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of the 
board . . . and the business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed by or under the 
direction . . . of its board of directors . . . .”); see also Kaplan ex rel Chase Manhattan Corp. v. Peat, 
Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 540 A.2d 726, 729 (Del. 1988) (stating that it is a “basic principal of 
[Delaware law] that the business and affairs of a corporation shall be managed by the board of 
directors”); Larry E. Ribstein, Why Corporations?, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 183, 188 (2004) (“[T]he 
corporate form of centralized management involves dividing management between professional full-
time executives who manage the firm day-to-day and directors who oversee the board and set policy.”). 
3
Shaner: Officer Accountability
Published by Reading Room, 2016
360 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:2 
rights.8 Separating ownership from control in this manner has many 
benefits, most prominently centralized decision-making; the efficient, 
effective utilization of director and officer expertise; and limited 
liability for stockholders.9 This form is not without drawbacks, 
however. When a corporation’s managers do not share in the 
ownership of the entity in the same manner as the stockholders, their 
economic incentives may not align, leaving stockholders exposed to 
potentially significant agency costs from self-interested or careless 
actions of the managers.10 Whether such actions are outright illegal, 
just unreasonably risky, self-serving, or some combination of them 
all, they can result in considerable harm to stockholders—not to 
mention the general public.11 
While both directors and officers may engage in opportunistic 
behavior at the expense of stockholders, a strong argument can be 
made that actions of officers pose the greatest risks to the corporation 
and its stakeholders. This is particularly true for public corporations 
(which is the primary focus of this article) where officers have taken 
on an outsized role within the enterprise.12 In the typical public 
                                                                                                                 
 8. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 6, at 6–7; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The 
Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 559 (2003) (“Shareholders 
essentially have no power to initiate corporate action and, moreover, are entitled to approve or 
disapprove only a limited set of board actions.”). 
 9. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987, 1051 (2010). 
Professors Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock describe the centralized management of the corporate form 
as “[o]ne of [its] great virtues” and accordingly, “[m]uch of corporate law can be interpreted as 
establishing and protecting that centralized management because of the benefits that it provides to the 
participants in the firm.” Id. See also Bainbridge, supra note 8, at 555–56 (vesting power in a 
centralized decision-maker “lower[s] costs associated with uncertainty, opportunism, and complexity”); 
Tom C.W. Lin, CEOs and Presidents, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1351, 1365–69 (2014) (describing the 
benefits of strong management and chief executive officer). 
 10. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 6, at 7 (stating that the “separation of ownership from control 
produces a condition where the interests of owner and of ultimate manager may, and often do, diverge”). 
This is the classic agency problem. Id. at 7. See also William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance 
Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 1375, 1397 (2007) (“According to classic agency theory, problems of opportunism 
and adverse selection among managers generate ‘agency costs’ that impair corporate performance.”); 
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs 
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
 11. See ABA REPORT, supra note 6, at 111 (stating that historically a major concern with the 
corporate form is that it provides management with the opportunity to “act in a self-interested manner” 
at the expense of stockholders); Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Reconsidering Board Oversight 
Duties After the Financial Crisis, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 859, 860 (2013) (“Corporate behavior in the 
[financial] crisis yielded enormous negative externalities for the greater society.”). 
 12. This article’s primary focus is officer accountability in the public corporation context. 
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corporation, senior executive officers such as the chief executive 
officer (CEO), not the board of directors, have primary day-to-day 
management authority.13 In connection with this expansive authority, 
and likely as a result thereof, officers often command immense 
discretion and deference.14 Under classic agency theory, however, if 
left unchecked, officers will exercise their power in their own self-
interest as opposed to in the best interests of the corporation and its 
stockholders.15 In fact, many of the major corporate scandals over the 
past twenty years were rooted in self-interested officer conduct, 
exposing the dangers of an officer-dominated model of corporate 
governance.16 Further, recent attempts to regulate officer conduct at 
the federal level illustrate the recognition of officers’ prominent roles 
in both corporate and broader economic welfare and the importance 
of reducing the agency costs that flow from their power.17 
                                                                                                                 
 13. See 1 R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 
AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 4.10[B] (3d ed. 2008) (stating that it is normally the officers to whom 
the primary management functions are delegated); Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities 
Fraud As Corporate Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 864 (2003) (“In 
reality, officers exercise the most important corporate powers . . . .”); see also ABA REPORT, supra note 
6, at 128 (stating that “[t]hroughout much of the last century, the professional managers hired to run 
public companies have wielded significant power in relation to both the board of directors and 
shareholders”). 
 14. See ABA REPORT, supra note 6, at 128 (noting that as executive officers took on greater 
management responsibility they were afforded greater latitude); Lin, supra note 9, at 1364–65 
(describing the organizational and legal deference); see also Jens Dammann, How Embattled Are U.S. 
CEOs?, 88 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 201, 201 (2010) (“What both sides agree upon, though, is that U.S. 
managers are in fact quite powerful, especially by international standards.”). But see Kahan & Rock, 
supra note 9, at 989 (asserting that CEOs of publicly held corporations are losing power). 
 15. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 6, at 7; Lin, supra note 9, at 1370–88 (discussing the perils of 
strong management, in particular the CEO, including capture, deference, overconfidence and 
aggrandizement); Troy A. Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference: Behavioral Corporate 
Finance, CEOs, and Corporate Governance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 673, 684 (2005) (stating that “there 
is no reason to assume that managers are necessarily motivated to maximize shareholder value”). 
 16. See James D. Cox, Private Litigation and the Deterrence of Corporate Misconduct, LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1997, at 1, 11 (“[T]here is hardly any behavior within the corporate setting 
that cannot be linked to advancing a manager’s self interest.”); Shaner, The (Un)Enforcement, supra 
note 3, at 289–94 (describing officers’ roles in Enron, WorldCom, option backdating, and the financial 
crisis); Thompson & Sale, supra note 13, at 861. 
 17. See ABA REPORT, supra note 6, at 145–46 (“Renewed concern that our society is deeply 
dependent on the continued health and viability of corporations for economic growth has heightened the 
scrutiny of current corporate governance practices.”); William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The 
New Federalism of the American Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two 
Residents of One Small State, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 953, 967–68, 999 (2003); Thompson & Sale, supra 
note 13, at 905–06; Charles K. Whitehead, Why Not a CEO Term Limit?, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1263, 1270–
71 (2011). 
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Oversight and accountability can reduce officer agency costs.18 As 
a general matter, accountability is vital to encourage legal 
compliance and deter misbehavior.19 In the corporate setting, 
increased management accountability is viewed as an important 
component in improving corporate governance and protecting 
stockholder interests.20 Accordingly, a central problem in corporate 
law is how to deploy accountability measures that allow a centralized 
management body the freedom to exercise its authority while 
protecting stockholders from the agency costs associated with that 
freedom.21 
One key tool for holding officers accountable is the imposition of 
fiduciary duties; indeed, it is a principal constraint on officer power 
under state corporate law.22 While officers may be given wide 
                                                                                                                 
 18. See Schwartz, supra note 1, at 324 (“The separation of control from ownership demands a 
system of accountability.”); Robert B. Thompson & Paul H. Edelman, Corporate Voting, 62 VAND. L. 
REV. 129, 144–49 (2009) (stating that the efficiency of the corporate form’s centralized decision-making 
must be balanced with monitoring and accountability). 
 19. See J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137, 1142 (2012) (noting that “our system of regulation is only as good as the 
enforcement mechanisms underlying it”); Richard C. Hollinger & John P. Clark, Deterrence in the 
Workplace: Perceived Certainty, Perceived Severity, and Employee Theft, 62 SOC. FORCES 398, 399 
(1983) (stating that “the consensus of empirical research is that perceived certainty of punishment is the 
most effective in shaping behavior”); Andrew Quinn & Barry R. Schlenker, Can Accountability 
Produce Independence? Goals as Determinants of the Impact of Accountability on Conformity, 28 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 472, 480 (2002) (finding that accountability can counteract 
unethical conduct and human behavior tendencies that undermine self-governance systems). 
 20. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 9, at 1051 (noting that centralizing management in the hands of 
paid managers “creates agency costs for the shareholder-manager, the prevention of which forms such 
an important part of corporate law”); Ribstein, supra note 7, at 199 (“The main question regarding 
corporate governance . . . is whether powerful corporate managers are adequately accountable to 
shareholders’ interests.”). 
 21. See Stephen M. Bainbridge et al., The Convergence of Good Faith and Oversight, 55 UCLA L. 
REV. 559, 567–68 (2008) (“At the heart of corporate governance law lies the tension between the 
competing values of authority and accountability.”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment 
Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 86–87 (2004) [hereinafter Business Judgment Rule] 
(asserting that the business judgment rule “identifies the tension between authority and accountability as 
the central problem of corporate law”); see also Chandler & Strine, supra note 17, at 993 (“One of the 
central problems of corporate law has always been how to create a system whereby diffuse stockholders 
feel comfortable entrusting their capital to centralized management.”); ABA REPORT, supra note 6, at 
110 (“Maintaining an appropriate balance between responsibilities for corporate oversight and decision-
making is critical to the corporation’s capacity to serve as engine of economic growth, job creation, and 
innovation.”). 
 22. See In re Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 5215-VCG, 2011 WL 4826104, at *1 
(Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2011) (“Within the boundary of fiduciary duty, however, [officers and directors] are 
free to pursue corporate opportunities in any way that, in the exercise of their business judgment on 
6
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latitude in managing the business and affairs of the corporation, their 
authority must be exercised within the bounds of their fiduciary 
duties. This fiduciary constraint can be, and at least in the director 
context frequently is, enforced by stockholders suing for breaches of 
those duties.23 Stockholder litigation has been described as essential 
to a successful system of corporate governance and management 
accountability—giving meaning to the abstract concepts of fiduciary 
duties, supporting the disciplinary effect of those duties, and 
encouraging desirable conduct.24 
While fiduciary constraints are central to the system of checks and 
balances in corporate law, several scholars have posited that their 
effect, especially through judicial enforcement in state courts, is 
limited. Citing to the role reversal in corporate management, 
procedural hurdles in derivative litigation, and narrowing standards 
of oversight liability, prior scholarship concludes that better options 
for holding officers accountable exist outside of state court fiduciary 
litigation.25 Professors Thompson and Sale, for example, conclude 
                                                                                                                 
behalf of the corporation, they see fit.”); Thompson & Sale, supra note 13, at 865 (stating that “[t]he 
most important state law constraint is fiduciary duty”). This article assumes that fiduciary duties provide 
a sufficient constraint on officer conduct. For a discussion of whether this is a fair assumption, see Celia 
R. Taylor, The Inadequacy of Fiduciary Duty Doctrine: Why Corporate Managers Have Little to Fear 
and What Might Be Done About It, 85 OR. L. REV. 993 (2006). 
Moreover, scholars have cited many other constraints, legal and non-legal, on officer conduct. See 
Shaner, The (Un)Enforcement, supra note 3, at 278 n.17 (describing the different constraints on officer 
behavior); see also David M. Phillips, Principles of Corporate Governance: A Critique of Part IV, 52 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 653, 672 (1984) (“Extra-legal incentives, most notably those proffered by the 
existence and operation of certain markets, including the securities, executive employment, and products 
markets, already regulate managerial behavior.”). This article does not take a position on the relative 
effectiveness of the different mechanisms that constrain officer conduct. 
 23. See Thompson & Sale, supra note 13, at 861 (observing that “state fiduciary duty litigation 
continues as a mechanism frequently utilized to monitor managers”). 
 24. See Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., The Forgotten Derivative Suit, 61 VAND. L. REV. 387, 436–37 (2008) 
(“Derivative litigation performs the task of translating the abstract concepts of fiduciary obligation, good 
faith, and fairness into the specific limits on the insiders’ ability to favor themselves.”); Reinier 
Kraakman et al., When Are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder Interests?, 82 GEO. L.J. 1733, 1733 (1994) 
(“Shareholder suits are the primary mechanism for enforcing the fiduciary duties of corporate 
managers.”); Anne Tucker Nees, Who’s the Boss? Unmasking Oversight Liability Within the Corporate 
Power Puzzle, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 199, 214 (2010) (stating that “the shareholder derivative suit [is] an 
important tool to encourage and enforce complying behavior”); Schwartz, supra note 1, at 327. 
 25. See, e.g., Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors’ Fiduciary 
Duty Through Legal Liability, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 408–09 (2005) (“[S]cholars agree that the 
procedural rules related to derivative suits severely limit the ability of shareholders to bring legal actions 
to impose liability on directors for violating their fiduciary duty.”); Nees, supra note 24, at 215 
7
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that stockholder securities fraud litigation has several practical 
advantages over state stockholder litigation, which has contributed to 
the greater use of the former in holding officers accountable.26 
Similarly, Professors Johnson and Ricca contend that officer 
fiduciary accountability is not occurring in the traditional state 
litigation context but rather in alternative venues like bankruptcy 
court.27 Finally, scholars have construed studies on CEO turnover 
rates as suggesting that boards of directors are reasserting themselves 
through intra-corporate sanctioning, as opposed to judicial 
sanctioning, of officers.28 
This article explores an underlying premise of this prior 
scholarship: that officers are not frequently or effectively being held 
accountable for compliance with their fiduciary duties in the context 
of traditional state court litigation. Specifically, this article takes a 
first step in studying the status of state court accountability by 
looking at those instances where the Delaware courts are 
commenting on the issue of an officer’s fiduciary duties.29 To do so, 
this article reviews Delaware state court and bankruptcy court 
opinions from 2004 to 2014 that include or discuss breach of 
fiduciary duty claims against corporate officers.30 This research has 
                                                                                                                 
(addressing the narrow duty of oversight); Shaner, The (Un)Enforcement, supra note 3, at 303–19 
(discussing how the dynamic in corporate management and development of corporate doctrine has led to 
the (un)enforcement of officer fiduciary duties). 
 26. See Thompson & Sale, supra note 13, at 861. 
 27. Lyman Johnson & Robert Ricca, Reality Check on Officer Liability, 67 BUS. LAW. 75, 95–97 
(2011) (positing that “the non-criminal sanctioning of officers may be taking place in federal bankruptcy 
courts with respect to fiduciary duties”). 
 28. See, e.g., id. at 87 (“We expect that most officer misconduct coming to the attention of the board 
will be resolved [internally].”); Ken Favaro et al., CEO Succession 2010: The Four Types of CEOs, 
STRATEGY+BUS., Summer 2011, at 11, http://www.strategyand.pwc.com/media/file/Strategyand-CEO-
Succession-2010-Four-Types.pdf (finding that boards of operationally involved corporations “tend to be 
more informed and engaged in monitoring strategy”); Kahan & Rock, supra note 9, at 1030–32 (citing 
CEO turnover as an indicator of greater substantive board independence and that CEOs are losing their 
power); Chuck Lucier et al., The Era of the Inclusive Leader, STRATEGY+BUS., Summer 2007, at 12, 
http://www.boozallen.com/media/file/Era_of_the_Inclusive_Leader_.pdf (concluding that boards are 
“more deeply engaged and owners actively involved in governance and strategy”); see also Paul Graf, A 
Realistic Approach to Officer Liability, 66 BUS. LAW. 315, 333 (2011). But see Dammann, supra note 
14, at 204 (pointing to executive compensation and golden parachutes, as opposed to decreasing CEO 
power, to explain shorter CEO tenure). 
 29. It should be noted that a more in-depth empirical analysis of litigation rates and allegations in 
complaints would be necessary to draw stronger conclusions than what this article is able to do. 
 30. This article primarily focuses on Delaware law because Delaware case law and statutes are 
8
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two goals. The first is to add to our understanding of efforts to hold 
officers accountable via state law litigation for their breaches of 
fiduciary duty. The second is to tease out the interpretations and 
implications of the results of this research on the law applicable to 
corporate officers’ fiduciary duties. The purpose of this article is not 
to provide an explanation for any disparity between officer 
accountability in state court versus other venues. Rather, the intention 
is to provide insight into the officer fiduciary duty accountability 
landscape (as reflected in the Delaware courts’ opinions) as well 
touch on the related issues of officer conduct and enforcement. 
Viewed in that light, this research can be useful in adding to the 
discussion of issues such as how one thinks about the role of officers, 
the current system of checks and balances on officer conduct, and the 
broad goal of increased officer accountability. 
Providing a backdrop for this research project, Part I of this article 
presents an overview of the role of officers in the modern corporation 
and the need for fiduciary accountability to balance their 
considerable power and authority.31 Part II provides the results of the 
collection and analysis of Delaware state and bankruptcy court 
decisions from 2004 to 2014 that discuss officer fiduciary duty 
claims.32 The results reveal a relatively modest number of traditional 
fiduciary duty claims against officers, consistent with prior scholars’ 
                                                                                                                 
generally considered to be the leading source for corporate law. See, e.g., William T. Allen, The Pride 
and the Hope of Delaware Corporate Law, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 70, 71 (2000) (stating that the DGCL “is 
certainly the nation’s and indeed the world’s leading organization law for large scale business 
enterprise”); Chandler & Strine, supra note 17, at 959 (using Delaware law for their analysis as it is 
“generally representative of state corporate laws”); Ribstein, supra note 7, at 230 (noting the “continued 
dominance of Delaware corporation law”). Delaware’s corporate law prominence is due, in part, to the 
high incorporation rates in that state. See infra notes 69–74 and accompanying text. 
In addition to state law stockholder litigation, bankruptcy trustees may file claims against a bankrupt 
corporation’s officers for breach of fiduciary duty. See infra Part II.C. In fact, Delaware’s bankruptcy 
courts began tackling the issue of officer fiduciary duties even before the Delaware Supreme Court’s 
decision in Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009). See, e.g., In re Bridgeport Holdings, Inc., 
388 B.R. 548, 573 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008). Table 2, infra, provides a complete picture of officer 
accountability data on publicly-available opinions involving or referencing officer breach of fiduciary 
duty claims in the bankruptcy context in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware 
for the same 2004 to 2014 time period. 
 31. See infra Part I. 
 32. See infra Part II. 
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beliefs.33 Part II also provides breakdowns of the research by (i) the 
types of cases filed, (ii) the context in which fiduciary breaches were 
alleged, and (iii) the enforcement scheme surrounding the claims 
advanced.34 Based on these categorizations, this section of the article 
includes discussions of how the results also appear to provide support 
for scholars’ other beliefs surrounding fiduciary accountability for 
officers.35 
Part III then explores possible interpretations and implications of 
the research.36 Specifically, the article collects and synthesizes the 
courts’ statements regarding officer fiduciary duties—which tend to 
be scant, fragmented, or both—into a clearer statement of the law 
surrounding officer fiduciary duty doctrine.37 The opinions also 
reveal a pattern of superficial use of sweeping language for 
precedential purposes and reliance on established legal principles 
both by the plaintiffs bringing these claims and the courts in 
analyzing them.38 Judicial reluctance to address the contours of 
officer fiduciary claims, in combination with the reliance on 
established principles, has contributed to the apparent stalling in the 
development of officer fiduciary doctrine.39 Finally, Part IV provides 
a brief agenda for future research regarding officers’ accountability 
for their fiduciary duties, including some initial thoughts on the role 
of litigation in shaping officer accountability and fiduciary duties.40 
This article concludes that any discussion of improving corporate 
governance through accountability should include a purposeful focus 
on the interplay of officer accountability with the development of 
fiduciary duty doctrine. 
                                                                                                                 
 33. See infra Part II.B. 
 34. See infra Part II. 
 35. See infra Part II.D.–II.E. 
 36. See infra Part III. 
 37. See infra Part III.A. 
 38. See infra Part III. 
 39. See id. 
 40. See infra Part IV. 
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I. CORPORATE OFFICERS AND THE NEED FOR ACCOUNTABILITY 
The officer occupies an important space in corporate management 
and leadership. Although the board of directors is statutorily charged 
with managing the business and affairs of the corporation, it can 
delegate much of its authority to officers.41 Today—especially in 
large public corporations—most, if not all, of the management 
responsibility is delegated to the corporation’s officers.42 This has led 
to an officer-dominated model of corporate governance, with officers 
exerting immense power and influence over the corporation.43 
Indeed, the rise of the CEO nicely illustrates the power, impact, and 
stature of these individuals.44 Excessive levels of CEO compensation 
and, until recently, the role of the CEO as the chairman of the board, 
reflect the significant control this one officer has over corporate 
                                                                                                                 
 41. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2006). 
 42. See BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 13, at § 4.10[C] (stating that “normally it is the officers 
to whom the primary functions of management are delegated”); Ribstein, supra note 7, at 188 (“[T]he 
corporate form of centralized management involves dividing management between professional full-
time executives who manage the firm day-to-day and directors who oversee the board and set policy.”); 
Thompson & Sale, supra note 13, at 905–06 (“As our business enterprises have become larger and more 
complex, increased power has passed to chief executive officers and the line hierarchy that flows from 
that person.”). 
 43. See Amitai Aviram, Officers’ Fiduciary Duties and the Nature of Corporate Organs, 2013 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 763, 777–79 (2013) (describing the different ways in which officers can dominate the 
board); Johnson & Ricca, supra note 27, at 82 (“Of the three main actors in corporate governance 
(shareholders, directors, and officers), the officers clearly continue to reign supreme.”); Lin, supra note 
9, at 1353 (“Chief executives run the world.”); Usha Rodrigues, From Loyalty to Conflict: Addressing 
Fiduciary Duty at the Officer Level, 61 FLA. L. REV. 1, 1, 6 (2009) (describing corporate officers as the 
“true corporate decisions makers” and the “powerbrokers of the corporation”).  
  It is arguable whether federal corporate reform requiring independent directors to serve on the 
boards of public corporations has lessened the power of the executive officer. Following adoption of 
Sarbanes-Oxley and the stock exchange reforms, at least two members of the Delaware judiciary 
thought there would not be a significant impact on officer power: 
Given the unmistakable message that independent directors are preferred, it will 
become increasingly unlikely that even the three managers most critical to 
governing a firm on a day-to-day basis will be on the board. But it is doubtful that 
this overall decline in board service by top managers will correspond with any 
genuine reduction in the importance of key executives to the management of 
public companies. 
Chandler & Strine, supra note 17, at 1002. But see Kahan & Rock, supra note 9, at 989 (asserting that 
CEOs are losing power in part because of federal reforms). 
 44. See Lin supra note 9, at 1364 (stating “CEOs can govern firms like corporate emperors and 
empresses, holding primacy over shareholders, directors, and managers”). 
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decision-making.45 As a corporate scholar recently remarked, “two of 
the most intriguing and influential figures in law and society [are] the 
President of the United States and the CEO of a large corporation.”46 
The separation of corporate ownership from corporate control 
exposes stockholders to a variety of agency costs.47 Similar to 
ordinary agents, officers pose a risk that in managing the business 
they will act in their own self-interest at the expense of the 
corporation and its stockholders.48 The escalation of officers’ power 
and role in the corporate enterprise has led to a corresponding 
increase in these agency costs.49 Exercising their considerable 
expertise, authority and deference, executive officers can, and many 
times do, use their position for their own personal benefit.50 
Recognizing that this is the reality of the modern corporation, the 
Delaware Court of Chancery commented, “It is, of course, true that 
most examples of malfeasance by corporate fiduciaries involve 
officers who exploit their superior knowledge, power, and influence 
to extract value from the corporation at the expense of its 
stockholders.”51 
Given the breadth of officers’ power and control, the corporate 
system of checks and balances on officer conduct is of great 
                                                                                                                 
 45. See Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers Are Fiduciaries, 
46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597, 1617 (2005) (discussing the CEO-chairman of the board problem); 
Ribstein, supra note 7, at 199–200 (stating excessive executive compensation supports an officer-
dominated model of corporate decision-making); see also Paredes, supra note 15, at 673 (noting the 
“extensive corporate control concentrated in [CEOs’] hands and the fact that they are rarely seriously 
challenged”). 
 46. Lin, supra note 9, at 1354. 
 47. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 6, at 6–7. 
 48. See sources cited supra note 15. 
 49. See Brian Cheffins, Corporate Governance Since the Managerial Capitalism Era, at 1 (July 
2015) (forthcoming Business History Review), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=261 
480&download=yes (“[F]or at least three-quarters of a century managerial ‘agency costs’ generated by 
inattentive or self-serving executives have constituted the core governance risk in the U.S.”); Park 
McGinty, The Twilight of Fiduciary Duties: On the Need for Shareholder Self-Help in an Age of 
Formalistic Proceduralism, 46 EMORY L.J. 163, 189 (1997) (“Because they possess greater and more 
specialized expertise than ordinary workers, they can divert more wealth to themselves without the 
principal’s being able to prevent (or even necessarily detect) such losses.”); Whitehead, supra note 17, 
at 1265 (discussing the increase in agency costs as CEOs use their “control over the board” to their 
benefit). 
 50. See supra notes 16–17. 
 51. In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1003 (Del. Ch. 2005); see also ABA 
REPORT, supra note 6, at 111; Whitehead, supra note 17, at 1265–66. 
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significance. Under state law, fiduciary duties serve as a primary 
check on officer behavior.52 Boards of directors, stockholders, and 
creditors all have, albeit to differing degrees, the power to directly 
enforce officers’ fiduciary obligations. Principal among the 
enforcement mechanisms available to these corporate actors is the 
ability to file direct or derivative lawsuits alleging breaches of 
fiduciary duty. Accountability through litigation is thus a crucial 
component of the system of checks and balances on management 
power.53 Indeed, stockholder litigation (both class actions and 
derivative suits) is described as the primary means for stockholders to 
protect their interests against the opportunistic behavior of directors 
and officers.54 This is because litigation serves both a compensatory 
function and a deterrence function in combatting misconduct.55 
                                                                                                                 
 52. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. The fiduciary obligations of officers, as distinguished 
from directors, is a topic in corporate law that has received relatively little individual attention. BALOTTI 
& FINKELSTEIN, supra note 13, at § 4.10[C] (“Few authorities deal with the nature of the obligation 
owed by officers to the corporation and its stockholders.”); Johnson & Millon, supra note 45, at 1601 
(“Hardly a week goes by without yet another Delaware decision addressing the subject of director 
duties. Yet, surprisingly, no Delaware decision has ever clearly articulated the subject of officer duties 
and judicial standards for reviewing their discharge.”); Shaner, Restoring the Balance, supra note 3, at 
29 (“[T]he exact nature and scope of an officer’s fiduciary obligations were left virtually untouched by 
the Delaware courts and legislature for almost seventy years, despite Delaware’s otherwise vast and 
well-developed body of corporate law.”); A. Gilchrist Sparks III & Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Common 
Law Duties of Non-Director Corporate Officers, 48 BUS. LAW. 215, 215 (1992) (“The precise nature of 
the duties and liabilities of corporate officers who are not directors is a topic that has received little 
attention from courts and commentators.”). This has led to disagreement and uncertainty as to the exact 
contours of those duties. See Shaner, The (Un)Enforcement, supra note 3, at 297–99. Nonetheless, what 
is uniformly recognized is that officers do owe some form of fiduciary obligations. See 3 WILLIAM 
MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 837.50 (rev. 
vol. 2002) (“[C]orporate directors and officers occupy a fiduciary capacity . . . .”); Lyman P.Q. Johnson 
& Robert V. Ricca, (Not) Advising Corporate Officers About Fiduciary Duties, 42 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 663, 669 (2007) (“What apparently is not controversial, however, is that officers owe fiduciary 
duties of some sort . . . .”). 
 53. See, e.g., Kraakman et al., supra note 24, at 1733 (“Shareholder suits are the primary mechanism 
for enforcing the fiduciary duties of corporate managers.”); Schwartz, supra note 1, at 324 (describing 
derivative litigation as the “heart of the accountability devices”). 
 54. See Browning Jeffries, The Plaintiffs’ Lawyer’s Transaction Tax: The New Cost of Doing 
Business in Public Company Deals, 11 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 55, 55 (2014) (“Shareholder litigation has 
historically played an important role in policing the behavior of corporate managers.”); Kraakman et al., 
supra note 24, at 1733. Moreover, a study of derivative lawsuits in both the public and private company 
contexts concluded that derivative litigation serves an important function that “goes well beyond the 
outcome of the cases themselves.” Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Private 
Faces of Derivative Lawsuits, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1749 (2004). 
 55. See Jessica Erickson, Corporate Misconduct and the Perfect Storm of Shareholder Litigation, 84 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 75, 78 (2008) (“Scholars have long recognized that shareholder litigation is 
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Until recently, the reach of the Delaware courts’ jurisdiction to 
hold corporate management legally accountable for their fiduciary 
duties was essentially limited to directors.56 This changed in 2003 
when the Delaware legislature amended its personal jurisdiction 
statute, extending jurisdiction over certain non-resident corporate 
officers.57 Following this amendment, one notable Delaware jurist 
predicted a marked increase in litigation involving officers.58 Over 
the past ten years, however, there have been only a handful of 
noteworthy decisions from the Delaware courts that address officers’ 
fiduciary obligations. The most prominent officer decision was 
Gantler v. Stephens in 2009, where the Delaware Supreme Court held 
that “officers of Delaware corporations, like directors, owe fiduciary 
duties of care and loyalty, and that the fiduciary duties of officers are 
the same as those of directors.”59 Indeed, Gantler itself illustrates the 
lack of officer case law, in that it was not until 2008 (four years after 
the personal jurisdiction statute became effective) that the issue of 
officer fiduciary duties was squarely brought before the Delaware 
Court of Chancery.60 Since Gantler, however, there have been very 
few decisions from Delaware courts expanding on the fiduciary 
                                                                                                                 
intended to deter future instances of corporate misconduct and punish the individuals involved in 
corporate scandals.”); George S. Geis, Shareholder Derivative Litigation and the Preclusion Problem, 
100 VA. L. REV. 261, 268 (2014) (“Even better, the threat of private legal action could prevent bad 
behavior in the first place.”). But see Erickson, supra, at 79 (“In the end, more litigation is not 
necessarily better when it comes to combating corporate misconduct.”). 
 56. Cf. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114(b) (2006). Prior to 2004, the Delaware courts lacked 
personal jurisdiction over non-resident officers of Delaware corporations. Id. 
 57. Id. The amendment to the statute became effective January 1, 2004. Id. (providing for personal 
jurisdiction over officers of Delaware corporations with respect to all civil actions or proceedings where 
such officer “is a necessary or proper party, or in any action or proceeding against such officer for 
violation of a duty in such capacity, whether or not the person continues to serve as such officer at the 
time suit is commenced”); see generally Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
 58. See Jack B. Jacobs, The Delaware Supreme Court: Looking to the Future, M & A LAW., June 
2004, at 1, 5. 
 59. Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708–09 (Del. 2009). As the Delaware Supreme Court 
explained: 
That issue—whether or not officers owe fiduciary duties identical to those of 
directors—has been characterized as a matter of first impression for this Court. In 
the past, we have implied that officers of Delaware corporations, like directors, 
owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty, and that the fiduciary duties of officers 
are the same as those of directors. We now explicitly so hold. 
Id. 
 60. Gantler v. Stephens, No. 2392-VCP, 2008 WL 401124 (Del. Ch. Feb. 14, 2008). 
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duties of officers.61 The apparent lack of legal accountability raises 
questions with respect to the role fiduciary duty litigation is playing 
in shaping officer conduct.62 
II. FIDUCIARY DUTY ACCOUNTABILITY 
Standards of conduct (for example, fiduciary duties) coupled with 
the imposition of sanctions for violations of those standards (in other 
words, accountability) serve as an important component in 
combatting self-interested and careless officer behavior.63 
Accountability can be broadly categorized as formal or informal in 
nature. Examples of formal accountability include litigation and other 
forms of legal liability like fines, cease and desist orders, and internal 
disciplinary actions (for example, firing and demotion). Informal 
methods of accountability can include market constraints and other 
market effects, social norms, and shaming.64 
                                                                                                                 
 61. In those few decisions that do discuss officers’ duties, most simply cite to the Gantler court’s 
holding without further development of officer fiduciary doctrine. See, e.g., Hampshire Grp., Ltd. v. 
Kuttner, No. 3607-VCS, 2010 WL 2739995, at *11−12 (Del. Ch. July 12, 2010); Beard Research, Inc. 
v. Kates, 8 A.3d 573, 601 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
 62. Shaner, The (Un)Enforcement, supra note 3, at 282; cf. Brian Cheffins et al., Delaware 
Corporate Litigation and the Fragmentation of the Plaintiffs’ Bar, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 427, 432 
(2012) (noting that the plaintiffs’ bar plays an important role in shaping the regulation and governance 
of corporations because they “largely determine which lawsuits are brought” and where those suits are 
brought). 
 63. It should be noted that in corporate law fiduciary duties set forth the standards of conduct that we 
expect of officers, while the standard of review is the test a court applies to determine whether an officer 
is liable for breach of fiduciary duty (e.g., the business judgment rule). See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The 
Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 
437, 437 (1993). 
 64. In the context of the board of directors, scholarship is divided over the impact of informal 
methods of accountability (or extra-legal sanctions) on influencing behavior. Some scholars assert that 
extra-legal forces or sanctions can adequately control management behavior. See, e.g., Bernard Black et 
al., Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1133–35 (2006); John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement 
of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 718 (1986) (reputational 
concerns); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1265 
(1999) (reputational concerns); Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. 
REV. 1259, 1263–64 (1982) (market regulation); Sean J. Griffith, Deal Protection Provisions in the Last 
Period of Play, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1899, 1937 (2003) (discussing the market for corporate control as 
a means of applying pressure on management); Renee M. Jones, Law, Norms, and the Breakdown of the 
Board: Promoting Accountability in Corporate Governance, 92 IOWA L. REV. 105, 116–17 (2006) 
(discussing the role of employment markets, product markets and social norms in regulating director 
conduct); Phillips, supra note 22, at 673; Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and 
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Prior scholarship addressing officer conduct has largely focused on 
forms of formal, judicial accountability. This scholarship has almost 
uniformly concluded that officers are largely being held accountable 
in venues other than traditional state law fiduciary duty litigation. 
Securities fraud litigation and bankruptcy litigation have been 
proffered as two alternative litigation contexts in which officer 
accountability occurs.65 Alternatively, some scholars posit that the 
majority of officer accountability takes place via internal corporate 
sanctioning.66 Underlying the aforementioned conclusions is the 
belief that traditional fiduciary duty litigation is not being utilized to 
hold officers accountable. Scholars have posited that a lack of state 
court litigation is due to procedural hurdles in derivative litigation, 
the role reversal between the board and officers in corporate 
management, and the narrow standard for board oversight liability.67 
This section collects and analyzes state and bankruptcy court 
opinions to discern whether the case law supports scholars’ views 
regarding officer misconduct and fiduciary duty litigation. 
A. Case Selection 
Delaware state court cases and bankruptcy court cases in the 
United States Bankruptcy Court, District of Delaware were selected 
as the universe from which opinions that include fiduciary duty 
                                                                                                                 
the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 262–73 (1977) (pointing out the employment 
market and product market as constraining management actions). However, other scholars question 
whether extra-legal sanctions impact management behavior. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, The 
Economic Structure of the Post-Contractual Corporation, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 180, 195–96 (1992) 
(asserting that anti-takeover doctrine has weakened the threat of a takeover and the corresponding 
disciplinary effect of a market for corporate control); Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency 
Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403, 1420–27 (1985) (discussing why market 
constraints on management behavior are ineffective); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The 
Proper Role of a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 
1169–70 (1981); Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the Modern 
Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1235 (2002) (noting that the 
events surrounding Enron’s collapse “provides another set of reasons to question the strength of the 
efficient market hypothesis”); Jones, supra, at 118 (critiquing the enforcement role of markets for failing 
to provide ample accountability). 
 65. See Johnson & Ricca, supra note 27, 95–97 (discussing bankruptcy litigation); Thompson & 
Sale, supra note 13, at 861 (looking at securities fraud litigation). 
 66. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 67. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
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claims against officers would be collected. Delaware is widely 
considered the leading jurisdiction for corporation law.68 This is due 
in large part to the overwhelming number of corporations 
incorporated in that state. Sixty-five percent of Fortune 500 
corporations are incorporated in Delaware as well as over half of all 
U.S. publicly traded corporations.69 For each year of 2011-2013, the 
number of new corporations that incorporated in Delaware was: 
31,472; 32,394; and 34,234, respectively.70 Additionally, in 2013, 
Delaware corporations represented 83% of all new U.S. initial public 
offers.71 
The state of incorporation has several important consequences. 
First among those is the internal affairs doctrine, which provides that 
the laws of a corporation’s state of incorporation, which in the 
majority of cases is Delaware, determine the rights and duties of 
directors, officers, and stockholders.72And “few, if any, claims are 
more central to a corporation’s internal affairs than those relating to 
alleged breaches of fiduciary duties by a corporation’s directors and 
officers.”73 Second, Delaware courts generally have jurisdiction over 
the parties and claims involved in breach of fiduciary duty cases.74 
Third and finally, Delaware’s judiciary is well-known for its 
expertise and efficiency in adjudicating business law disputes, 
                                                                                                                 
 68. See supra note 30. 
 69. See JEFFREY W. BULLOCK, DELAWARE DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS 2013 ANNUAL REPORT 
(2014), http://corp.delaware.gov/Corporations_2013%20Annual%20Report.pdf; see also Robert Daines, 
The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 1563 (2002). 
 70. See BULLOCK, supra note 69, at 2. 
 71. See BULLOCK, supra note 69, at 2. In comparison, corporations that were initially incorporated in 
New York changed their state of incorporation (primarily to Delaware) before going public. See William 
J. Carney et al., Lawyers, Ignorance, and the Dominance of Delaware Corporate Law, 2 HARV. BUS. L. 
REV. 123, 145 (2012) (stating that “New York retains only 24.5% of reincorporated companies, versus 
an overall average for all states of 38.1%”). 
 72. VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108, 1113–14 (Del. 2005) (“It 
is now well established that only the law of the state of incorporation governs and determines issues 
relating to a corporation’s internal affairs.”) (citing CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 
89–93 (1987)). This applies equally in the bankruptcy context. In re Fedders N. Am., Inc., 405 B.R. 527, 
538–39 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009) (applying the internal affairs doctrine in the bankruptcy context). 
 73. In re Fedders N. Am., Inc., 405 B.R. at 538–39 (citing In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 924 
A.2d 951 (Del. Ch. 2007)). 
 74. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114(b) (2006) (providing for personal jurisdiction over officers); 
28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (providing for personal jurisdiction); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) (providing for 
subject matter jurisdiction). 
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capturing a large percentage of corporate lawsuits.75 In light of the 
combination of all of these factors, breach of fiduciary duty claims 
against officers are more likely to be litigated in Delaware.76 
This article also focuses on judicial opinions as opposed to the 
complaints filed. A plaintiff’s complaint must have, at a minimum, 
some allegation(s) about an officer or individual’s actions in his or 
her officer role in order for the court to hear claims related such 
actions. Most complaints, however, typically just have broad 
statements about the officers that are not always pursued in the 
litigation.77 Opinions, on the other hand, reflect the issues, claims, 
                                                                                                                 
 75. See Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Veil: Is the Common Law the Problem?, 37 CONN. L. 
REV. 619, 626 (2005) (describing the Delaware judiciary and stating that “their experience, both prior to 
and after becoming judges, gives them an unmatched expertise in the field of corporate law”); see also 
Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate Charters, 68 
U. CIN. L. REV. 1061 (2000) (discussing the judicial lawmaking in Delaware corporate law and the 
specialization of the Court of Chancery). 
 76. There are, however, studies that suggest that Delaware may be losing some of its share of cases 
to other jurisdictions. See John Armour, Bernard Black & Brian Cheffins, Is Delaware Losing Its 
Cases?, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 605 (2012) [hereinafter Losing Cases]. A recent study found that 
Delaware attracted only 45.2% of all takeover litigation that could potentially go to Delaware—those 
cases in which the target corporation’s state of incorporation or location of its headquarters was 
Delaware. Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, Takeover Litigation in 2013, at 5 (Ohio St. U. 
Moritz C. of Law, Public Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper Series No. 236, 2014), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2377001 [hereinafter Takeover Litigation]; see also John Armour et al., 
Delaware’s Balancing Act, 87 IND. L.J. 1345, 1350 (2012) [hereinafter Balancing Act] (discussing 
“Delaware’s loss of litigation market share”); Losing Cases, supra at 605 (concluding “Delaware courts 
are losing market share in lawsuits, and Delaware companies are gaining lawsuits, often filed 
elsewhere”). This was reported as a slight decrease from 2012, in which 46.3% of that litigation took 
place in Delaware. Cain & Davidoff, Takeover Litigation, supra, at 5. Similarly, there has been a 
documented increase in lawsuits being filed in more than one jurisdiction (multi-forum litigation), 
meaning that Delaware is only one of several jurisdictions where fiduciary lawsuits are being filed. See, 
e.g., id.; Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, A Theory of Representative Shareholder Suits and 
Its Application to Multijurisdictional Litigation, 106 NW. U.L. REV. 1753 (2012). Nonetheless, as 
compared to other jurisdictions, Delaware courts have been found to “out-draw” those competitors. 
Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Great Game: The Dynamics of State Competition and 
Litigation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 465 (2015) [hereinafter A Great Game] (finding that Delaware captures 
higher percentages of takeover cases than other states including those regarded as corporate law centers 
(New York and Massachusetts) but appears to be losing out when directly competing for a case against 
California and New Jersey). 
 77. See, e.g., Verified Stockholder Derivative Complaint at 19, Friedman v. Khosrowshahi, No. 
9161, 2013 WL 6668572 (Del. Ch. Dec. 13, 2013) (“As officers and/or directors of the Company, each 
Defendant owed the Company and its shareholders the fiduciary obligation of loyalty.”); Second 
Amended and Supplemental Class Action Complaint at 6, In re Answers Corp. S’holders Litig., No. 
6170-VCN, 2011 WL 3859941 (Del. Ch. Aug. 26, 2011) (“Because of their positions as officers and/or 
directors of Answers.com, the Individual Defendants owed fiduciary duties of loyalty and due care to 
Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class including the duty to maximize the value Plaintiffs and the 
Class would receive for their shares.”). 
18
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 2
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol32/iss2/2
2016] OFFICER ACCOUNTABILITY 375 
and arguments that the parties have developed more fully after 
briefing and/or oral argument. Thus, judicial opinions are more likely 
than complaints to reflect the extent to which plaintiffs’ assert and 
develop claims pertaining to officer conduct. 
The opinions of the court will not necessarily capture all of the 
state law officer-fiduciary duty accountability cases though. For 
instance, the issues related to officer conduct may not be raised on 
every motion to dismiss or motion for preliminary injunction, even 
though they are part of the larger case. Lawsuits may also settle 
before the court has the opportunity to address officer fiduciary duty 
claims. Nonetheless, a strong argument can be made that judicial 
opinions are a proper starting point because, overall, they provide a 
better picture of officer accountability than allegations in a 
complaint.78 
The following summary provides a description of the collection 
process and criteria by which opinions were selected and classified. 
A search of Delaware cases was conducted using the Westlaw and 
Lexis databases, two of the largest sources of publicly available 
judicial opinions, and supplemented by Delaware Chancery Court 
websites. The timeframe for this search was January 1, 2004 (when 
Delaware’s personal jurisdiction amendment became effective), 
through December 31, 2014. The initial search was over-inclusive to 
capture all potential discussions of claims against officers for breach 
of fiduciary duty.79 Figure 1 provides the number of opinions from 
this initial search for (i) Delaware state courts (Superior Court, Court 
of Chancery, and Supreme Court), and (ii) the United States 
Bankruptcy Court, District of Delaware. In order to winnow the 
results down to the relevant set of cases, each opinion was read to 
determine if it contained a discussion, reference, or other indication 
that a claim against a corporate officer for breach of fiduciary duty 
                                                                                                                 
 78. Of course, allegations of breaches of fiduciary duties against officers in complaints also provide 
important information regarding officer accountability. Taken together, analysis of court opinions and 
complaints would provide a more complete picture of officers’ fiduciary accountability. Undertaking 
both areas of research would be too large a task for one paper, thus this article focuses just on the 
former. Data on complaints is left for future research. 
 79. The initial search results were intended to pick up any opinion that contained the following 
terms: “fiduciary dut!”, “officer”, and “breach”. 
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(as distinct from directors or individuals acting in the director 
capacity) was made.80 If an opinion met that criterion, it was then 
classified as either (i) a traditional fiduciary duty case (in other 
words, a case not arising in the bankruptcy context) or (ii) a 
bankruptcy case. Opinions were then further coded across the 
following attributes: (i) court, (ii) date, (iii) plaintiff type, (iv) type of 
officer(s), (v) whether the officer was also a director, (vi) whether the 
directors were also being sued, (vii) context of fiduciary breach,81 
(viii) type of claim (direct, derivative, or both), (ix) procedural 
posture, (x) court ruling, and (xi) whether there was any discussion of 
the officer’s fiduciary obligations. 
 
Figure 1. 
Court: Initial Search results: 
Delaware state courts 736 
United States Bankruptcy Court 
for District of Delaware 
126 
 
                                                                                                                 
 80. To the extent that there was more than one opinion related to a single case (which was defined as 
cases having the same civil action number, suits that were later consolidated into one case, and cases 
that were appealed to the Delaware Supreme Court), those opinions were treated together for purposes 
of the subsequent categorization so as to avoid duplication. 
  Cases involving (i) Section 220 books and records demands, (ii) officers’ claims for 
advancement and indemnification of expenses, and (iii) certified questions of law to the Delaware 
Supreme Court from non-Delaware courts or the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) via 
Article IV, Section 11(8) of the Delaware Constitution, were ultimately excluded from the collected 
results. With respect to Section 220 actions, these cases were excluded for two reasons. First, books and 
records demands and suits based thereon typically are the first step in investigating possible causes of 
action. To the extent that this investigation leads to a sufficient basis for filing claims against officers for 
breach of fiduciary duty, those suits are later filed and are otherwise captured in the search results. See, 
e.g., Sutherland v. Sutherland, No. 2399-VCN, 2010 WL 1838968, at *9 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2010); 
Feldman v. Cutaia, 951 A.2d 727, 732 (Del. 2008); Teachers’ Ret. Sys. of La. v. Scrushy, No. Civ.A. 
20529, 2004 WL 423122, at *2 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 2004). Second, the Section 220 action does not, by 
itself, trigger liability or other accountability with respect to a breaching officer. See DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 8, § 220 (2006) (granting stockholders access to books and records). Cases involving officer claims 
for advancement and/or indemnification of expenses were also excluded because the underlying claims 
against the officer were brought outside of the Delaware courts or, if brought in Delaware, it was 
confirmed that the underlying Delaware claims were already captured in the data set (and thus the 
advancement/indemnification suit would be duplicative). Finally, opinions of the Delaware Supreme 
Court that involved certified questions of law from non-Delaware courts or the SEC were excluded 
because the underlying litigation did not involve claims against officers brought in the Delaware courts. 
 81. The three contexts in which breaches occurred were (i) employer-employee disputes, (ii) mergers 
and acquisitions, and (iii) other fiduciary breaches (e.g., option backdating). 
20
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 2
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol32/iss2/2
2016] OFFICER ACCOUNTABILITY 377 
B. Traditional Fiduciary Duty Cases 
When corporate officers breach their fiduciary duties, one would 
expect a primary path for holding them accountable would be 
through filing direct or derivative claims in the Delaware courts. The 
Delaware Court of Chancery explains: 
The Delaware General Corporation Law is, for the most 
part, enabling in nature. It provides corporate directors and 
officers with broad discretion to act as they find appropriate 
in the conduct of corporate affairs. It is therefore left to 
Delaware case law to set a boundary on that otherwise 
unconstrained realm of action. The restrictions imposed by 
Delaware case law set this boundary by requiring corporate 
officers and directors to act as faithful fiduciaries to the 
corporation and its stockholders. Should these corporate 
actors perform in such a way that they are violating their 
fiduciary obligations—their core duties of care or loyalty—
their faithless acts properly become the subject of judicial 
action in vindication of the rights of the stockholders.82 
Scholars have likewise noted that lawsuits for breach of fiduciary 
duty are the primary means by which stockholders hold corporate 
management accountable for their actions.83 Below, Table 1 sets 
forth the opinions discussing officer allegations organized by year. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 82. In re Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 5215-VCG, 2011 WL 4826104, at *1 (Del. 
Ch. Oct. 12, 2011). 
 83. See Eugene V. Rostow, To Whom and for What Ends is Corporate Management Responsible?, in 
THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 46, 48 (Edward S. Mason ed., 1961) (describing derivative 
suits as “the most important procedure the law has yet developed to police the internal affairs of 
corporations”); Davis, supra note 24, at 437; Kraakman et al., supra note 24, at 1733 (“Shareholder suits 
are the primary mechanism for enforcing the fiduciary duties of corporate managers.”); Nees, supra note 
24, at 214 (asserting that stockholder derivative actions are an effective mechanisms for holding 
management liable); Schwartz, supra note 1, at 324 (describing derivative litigation as the “heart of the 
accountability devices”). 
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Table 1. Delaware State Court Opinions with Officer Fiduciary Duty 
Claims 
Year: Number of opinions: 
2004 11 
2005 2 
2006 9 
2007 5 
2008 10 
2009 9 
2010 9 
2011 4 
2012 7 
2013 11 
2014 9 
Total: 86 
 
Overall, there are very few opinions of the Delaware courts 
addressing breach of fiduciary duty claims against officers. This is in 
stark contrast to the numerous director fiduciary duty opinions issued 
by the Delaware courts each year. For example, in 2014, there were 
nine opinions of the Delaware courts that include discussions of 
officer fiduciary duty claims.84 Opinions of the Delaware courts that 
include discussions of director fiduciary duty claims, however, 
exceeded that number within just the first four months of 2014.85 
Given that investigations into the corporate scandals of the past 
fifteen years have revealed many instances of officer misconduct—
                                                                                                                 
 84. See supra Table 1. 
 85. See, e.g., Blaustein v. Lord Blatimore Capital Corp., 84 A.3d 954 (Del. 2014); Kahn v. M&F 
Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014); Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648 (Del. Ch. 2014); 
In re Orchard Enter., Inc. Stockholder Litig., 88 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2014); OTK Assocs., LLC v. 
Friedman, 85 A.3d 696 (Del. Ch. 2014); In re Rural Metro Corp., 88 A.3d 54 (Del. Ch. 2014); 
Houseman v. Sagerman, No. 8897-VCG, 2014 WL 1600724 (Del. Ch. Apr. 16, 2014); Frank v. 
Elgamal, No. 6120-VCN, 2014 WL 957550 (Del. Ch. Mar. 10, 2014); In re Gardner Denver, Inc. 
S’holder Litig., No. 8505-VCN, 2014 WL 715705 (Del. Ch. Feb. 21, 2014); In re Answers Corp. 
S’holder Litig., No. 6170-VCN, 2014 WL 463163 (Del. Ch. Feb. 3, 2014); see also Robert B. 
Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class 
Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 167 (2004) (observing that the majority of fiduciary litigation in 
Delaware involves challenges to director actions in the deal context). 
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much of which is or appears to be a violation of their fiduciary 
duties—the number of opinions speaking to officer fiduciary 
breaches seem disproportionately small. Further, there does not 
appear (at least facially) to be an upward trend in opinions following 
the amendment of the personal jurisdiction statute or the Gantler 
decision.86 
C. Bankruptcy Cases 
Traditional fiduciary duty claims are usually filed in the Delaware 
state courts. However, breaches of fiduciary duty by corporate 
officers also may be adjudicated in bankruptcy courts. In this context, 
the bankruptcy trustee, in addition to the corporation, stockholders or 
creditors, may file the breach of fiduciary duty claims.87 Adjudicating 
corporate governance disputes in the bankruptcy setting is not 
uncommon. For example, the Delaware bankruptcy courts tackled the 
issue of officer fiduciary obligations before the Delaware Supreme 
Court did in Gantler.88 In In re World Health Alts., Inc., for instance, 
the United States Bankruptcy Court, District of Delaware addressed 
the issue of oversight liability for officers.89 Similarly, in In re 
Bridgeport Holdings, Inc., the court addressed fiduciary duty claims 
against officers of the corporation.90 Table 2 sets forth the opinions of 
the United States Bankruptcy Court, District of Delaware for the 
same 2004–2014 timeframe. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 86. See supra note 60–61 and accompanying text. Of course, in focusing on opinions as opposed to 
complaints, it will not be surprising if there are few opinions for the first few years of this time frame as 
generally there is a lag between claims being initially filed and reaching a stage where the court is asked 
to issue a ruling or opinion in the matter. This means that many of the cases from 2004 and even 2005 
are based upon complaints filed before the personal jurisdiction statute regarding officers became 
effective. 
 87. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 353 (1985). In fact, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has indicated that “investigat[ing] the conduct of prior management to uncover and 
assert causes of action again the debtor’s officers and directors” is a required part of the bankruptcy 
trustee’s duties. Id. See also Meer v. Aharoni, No. 5141-CC, 2010 WL 2573767, at *6 (Del. Ch. June 
28, 2010). 
 88. Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 709 (Del. 2009); In re World Health Alts., Inc., 385 B.R. 
576, 591 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008). 
 89. In re World Health Alts., Inc., 385 B.R. at 591. 
 90. In re Bridgeport Holdings, Inc., 388 B.R. 548, 572–73 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008). 
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Table 2. U.S. Bankruptcy Court, District of Delaware Opinions with 
Officer Fiduciary Duty Claims 
Year: Number of opinions: 
2004 0 
2005 4 
2006 1 
2007 0 
2008 4 
2009 3 
2010 0 
2011 2 
2012 2 
2013 0 
2014 3 
Total: 19 
 
Early officer fiduciary duty decisions like In re World Health and 
In re Bridgeport Holdings led one set of scholars to posit that “the 
non-criminal sanctioning of officers may be taking place in federal 
bankruptcy courts [as opposed to the state courts] with respect to 
fiduciary duties.”91 Comparing the results in Tables 1 and 2, 
however, do not seem to support this conclusion. Rather, the number 
of Delaware state court opinions each year that discuss officer 
fiduciary duty claims are (with one exception) either equal to or 
greater than the number of bankruptcy court opinions. 
D. Types of Officer Misconduct 
In addition to indicating the number of instances in which claims 
related to an officer’s fiduciary obligations are litigated, the opinions 
also provide insight into the different contexts in which officer 
breaches were alleged to have occurred. For each opinion, the alleged 
breach(es) of fiduciary duty was categorized as occurring in one of 
three settings: (i) mergers and acquisitions (M&A), (ii) general 
                                                                                                                 
 91. Johnson & Ricca, supra note 27, at 95–97. 
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fiduciary duty breaches (for example, stock option backdating), or 
(iii) employer-employee disputes. The breakdown of the opinions by 
context is set forth in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2.92 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Twenty opinions (approximately 19% of the total number of 
opinions) address alleged breaches in the M&A context. The most 
prominent example of an officer breach in the M&A context is the 
Gantler decision, where certain officers violated their fiduciary 
duties by sabotaging their company’s sales process.93 Other claims 
against officers in this context include breaches related to self-
interested negotiations and side payments,94 inadequate sales price,95 
                                                                                                                 
 92. One of the cases dealt with claims that could be categorized as M&A and fiduciary duty. To 
avoid duplication, it was classified as an M&A case because the primary claims in the case revolved 
around that transaction. 
 93. Gantler, 965 A.2d at 704–05, 708–09. 
 94. See, e.g., Crescent/Mach I P’ship, L.P. v. Turner, No. Civ.A.17455-NC, 2005 WL 3618279, at 
*1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 23, 2005). 
 95. See, e.g., Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. v. Volgenau, No. 6354-VCN, 2013 WL 4009193, at *22 (Del. 
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and disclosure violations.96 In the employer-employee context, there 
are only four opinions, or approximately 4% of the total number of 
opinions. These cases involve typical disputes that occur in 
employment situations involving senior level employees. Generally, 
these cases raise fiduciary duty claims as well as improper use of 
confidential information, stealing corporate opportunities, and 
violations of non-compete agreements.97 Finally, all other breaches of 
fiduciary duty make up the largest percentage with 81 opinions, or 
approximately 77% of the total number of opinions. Almost all of 
these opinions deal with claims that an officer violated his or her duty 
of loyalty.98 This would suggest that it is the self-interested officer, as 
opposed to the careless officer, that plaintiffs are worried about, feel 
is worth pursuing legal claims against, or both.99 Further, the small 
number of care allegations may be a reflection of the impact the 
business judgment rule, exculpation, indemnification, and insurance 
are having. Although not all of these protections are applicable to 
officers, the impact of these protections on director liability may have 
had a spillover effect that minimizes plaintiffs’ use of the duty of care 
in litigation against officers.100 
                                                                                                                 
Ch. Aug. 5, 2013); Hokanson v. Petty, No. 3438-VCS, 2008 WL 5169633, at *1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 10, 
2008). 
 96. See, e.g., Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648, 653 (Del. Ch. 2014). 
 97. See, e.g., Beard Research, Inc. v. Kates, 8 A.3d 573, 580 (Del. Ch. 2010) (alleging that an 
executive vice president misappropriated trade secrets and usurped business opportunities of the 
corporation). 
 98. See, e.g., Hampshire Grp., Ltd. v. Kuttner, No. 3607-VCS, 2010 WL 2739995, at *33 (Del. Ch. 
July 12, 2010) (finding a breach of the duty of loyalty for participation in and/or overlooking financial 
irregularities to benefit CEO with improper expense reimbursement). 
 99. See also McGinty, supra note 49, at 163 (“Classically, the duty of loyalty is thought to afford 
shareholders their strongest protection and is often described as the heart of corporate law.”); Schwartz, 
supra note 1, at 326 (“[M]anagement’s greatest liability exposure is for breaches of the duty of loyalty. 
Such cases are far more appealing to lawyers who bring suits on contingent fee bases. They are easier to 
prove, and their facts typically glean more sympathy from judges and juries. The legal rules relax the 
burden of proof for plaintiffs in cases involving the duty of loyalty. Without actually having made a 
head count, I am satisfied that over ninety percent of the litigation involving breaches of duty by 
directors and officers involves cases claiming a breach of the duty of loyalty.”). 
 100. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2006) (providing that it only applies to directors of the 
corporation); Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 709 n.37 (Del. 2009) (stating that § 102(b)(7) does not 
protect officers); Lawrence A. Hamermesh & A. Gilchrist Sparks III, Corporate Officers and the 
Business Judgment Rule: A Reply to Professor Johnson, 60 BUS. LAW. 865, 865 (2005) (contending that 
the business judgment rule does apply to officers); Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Officers and the 
Business Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. LAW. 439, 440 (2005) (asserting that the business judgment rule does 
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E. Enforcement 
Accountability for fiduciary obligations is only possible if those 
obligations are enforced. Scholars have asserted the limited use of 
state court litigation to hold officers accountable for their fiduciary 
breaches is a reflection of an enforcement process that disincentivizes 
the use of this specific tool. Specifically, boards of directors lack the 
incentive and informational means to monitor and enforce officers’ 
duties.101 Additionally, stockholders are significantly deterred from 
bringing legal claims against officers due to the procedural rules 
governing derivative litigation that have made it an expensive, 
onerous process with little chance of success.102 Accordingly, this 
section analyzes the opinions based on (i) who is enforcing officers’ 
fiduciary duties through judicial means and (ii) whether the claims 
are direct or derivative in nature. As discussed more fully below, the 
opinions appear to support scholars’ assertions surrounding the role 
of fiduciary duty litigation as an enforcement mechanism. 
First, there are four corporate actors that have the ability to sue 
officers for breaching their fiduciary duties: the board of directors, 
stockholders, creditors, and bankruptcy trustee. Table 3 provides a 
summary of the opinions organized by which of these actors 
instituted the litigation. 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
not apply to officers). 
 101. See Shaner, The (Un)Enforcement, supra note 3, at 303–11 (discussing the problems with the 
board enforcing officers’ duties). 
 102. See id. at 311–18 (discussing the enforcement scheme surrounding officer fiduciary duties and 
positing that litigation burdens and corporate doctrine contribute to a lack of officer accountability); cf. 
John C. Coffee, Jr. & Donald E. Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a 
Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 326 (1981) (discussing “three distinct 
barriers” to the effectiveness of derivative actions); Fairfax, supra note 25, at 408–09 (describing 
procedural hurdles to shareholder actions); Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability 
Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. 
REV. 261, 286 (1986) (listing rules that limit the shareholders’ ability to bring derivative suits); 
Rodrigues, supra note 43, at 34–35 (describing the difficulties faced in bringing a derivative suit); Ann 
M. Scarlett, A Better Approach for Balancing Authority and Accountability in Shareholder Derivative 
Litigation, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 39, 40 (2008) (explaining that “[s]hareholder derivative 
litigation . . . rarely succeeds in holding directors liable for their decisions”); Schwartz, supra note 1, at 
339–40 (discussing the board’s ability to terminate a suit, usually through a special litigation 
committee). 
27
Shaner: Officer Accountability
Published by Reading Room, 2016
384 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:2 
Table 3. Corporate Actor Instituting Litigation ** 
Board of directors: 14* 
Stockholders: 72 
Creditor: 6 
Bankruptcy trustee: 12*** 
*In one of these cases, a special litigation committee of the board 
took over the litigation from the stockholder-plaintiffs. 
**One of these cases involves a warrant holder as the plaintiff. 
Because of the unusual nature of such a plaintiff (in this case an 
equity holder who was not also a stockholder), that case was 
excluded only for this specific table. 
***In one of these cases the trustee of the litigation trust brought 
claims on behalf of the creditors. 
 
Not surprisingly, stockholders make up the vast majority of 
plaintiffs in litigation challenging the conduct of officers on fiduciary 
duty grounds. Exercising their right to sue is the only direct means by 
which stockholders can hold officers accountable for their actions.103 
This result is also consistent with prior commentary on the role of 
stockholder litigation as a primary enforcement mechanism for 
management’s fiduciary duties.104 Further, stockholders brought 
almost all of the suits involving M&A activity (the exception being 
two cases in which the bankruptcy trustee brought the claims). This 
specific result is to be expected. By statute, boards of directors must 
approve all mergers and major acquisitions or sales.105 As a result, in 
the event that a board wanted to hold an officer accountable for self-
interested negotiations of a merger, filing litigation against that 
individual would expose the board to allegations of breach of the 
                                                                                                                 
 103. See Schwartz, supra note 1, at 342–43 (describing the enforcement mechanisms available to 
stockholders); see generally CHARLES R.T. O’KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND 
OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 157 (6th ed. 2010) (describing the rights of stockholders and including 
the right to vote, sell, or sue). 
 104. Kraakman et al., supra note 24, at 1733 (“Shareholder suits are the primary mechanism for 
enforcing the fiduciary duties of corporate managers.”); Schwartz, supra note 1, at 323 (“Liability rules, 
enforced by shareholder litigation, are theoretically sound and profoundly affect the conduct of 
corporate managers, at least some aspects of their duties.”); Shaner, The (Un)Enforcement, supra note 3, 
at 311–19 (discussing stockholders’ role as an enforcer); Thompson & Sale, supra note 13, at 861. 
 105. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251, 252, 271 (2006). 
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duty of oversight, care, and loyalty for failing to monitor the officers’ 
actions and for approving the self-interested deal. Moreover, almost 
all large transactions involving public corporations generate 
litigation, which usually includes allegations made against the board 
of directors.106 When a board is busy addressing allegations made 
against it, it can be difficult to sue an officer. 
Similarly unsurprising is the small number of cases brought by 
creditors. This is a reflection of the limited circumstances in which a 
creditor has the right to bring a derivative suit for directors’ or 
officers’ breach of fiduciary duty. As the Delaware Supreme Court 
made clear in Gheewalla, fiduciary duties run to the corporation and 
not creditors except when a corporation is in the zone of 
insolvency.107 Thus, only in those limited instances when a 
corporation is in the zone of insolvency may a creditor assert 
derivative claims against corporate management. 
Less than 14% of the officer claims were instituted by the board of 
directors on behalf of the corporation.108 There are several possible 
explanations for such a small number. First, the board has a few 
different methods available to it for sanctioning officers. In addition 
to filing a breach of fiduciary duty lawsuit, boards can hold an officer 
accountable through termination, demotion, compensation claw-
backs, social pressures, and contractual remedies.109 Thus, the above 
findings may be a reflection of boards’ preferences to handle officer 
accountability through non-judicial means. Somewhat related, the 
low number of board-instituted suits may constitute only those 
instances of officer conduct that are so egregious that the board feels 
litigation is the only option, when the board has the greatest incentive 
to pursue expensive litigation, or both. This reasoning may then 
explain why the board brought all of the breach of fiduciary duty 
claims in the employer-employee context—in those situations where 
                                                                                                                 
 106. See Cain & Davidoff, Takeover Litigation, supra note 76, at 3. 
 107. N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 99–103 (Del. 
2007); Shaner, The (Un)Enforcement, supra note 3, 320–22 (discussing creditors’ role as an enforcer of 
officer fiduciary duties). 
 108. Table 3, supra. 
 109. Johnson & Ricca, supra note 27, at 87. 
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the board has strong incentives to seek judicial resolution of the 
corporation’s rights vis-à-vis one of its employees. Moreover, in 
employer-employee disputes, judicial relief like enforcement of a 
non-compete clause or an injunction prohibiting use of confidential 
information is frequently the most desirable as well as most practical 
solution. 
A final explanation for the low percentage of board-instituted 
actions may be the effects of a role reversal in corporate management 
that scholars have observed where officers occupy a superior role to 
directors and thus the board defers to officer interests.110 This would 
also explain why only marginally more opinions came from the 
board-instituted suits context rather than the bankruptcy context; the 
bankruptcy trustee would not be subject to the same structural bias, 
behavioral bias, or pressures in favor of management. 
Second, looking at the types of claims that are being filed and the 
procedural history for those claims provides additional insight into 
those instances in which litigation was used as an enforcement device 
for officer duties. Approximately 33.7% of the opinions in Delaware 
state courts involve direct claims, 51.2% involve derivative claims, 
and 15.1% raise both derivative and direct claims.111 With respect to 
the derivative claims, the sample includes 27 opinions in which the 
court addresses, at least in part, defendants’ Chancery Court Rule 
23.1 motion to dismiss based on a failure to make a demand on the 
board.112 Twelve of those opinions granted the motion to dismiss the 
                                                                                                                 
 110. See ALFRED F. CONRAD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 349–50 (1976) (“[Directors] do not 
supervise and control the executives; rather, they are supervised and controlled by the executives.”); JAY 
W. LORSCH & ELIZABETH MACIVER, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE REALITY OF AMERICA’S 
CORPORATE BOARDS 20 (1989); see also Arthur J. Goldberg, Debate on Outside Directors, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 29, 1972, at F1 (stating that the board has been “relegated to an advisory and legitimizing 
function”): Tom C.W. Lin, The Corporate Governance of Iconic Executives, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
351, 363–73 (2011) (describing organizational and legal deference given to iconic executives); Paredes, 
supra note 15, at 721–22 (describing how CEOs have additional “de facto power” as a result of 
subordinate officers, gatekeepers, boards and stockholders defer to them). 
 111. Data on file with the author. 
 112. Delaware Chancery Court Rule 23.1 requires that a derivative complaint allege with particularity 
the reasons why demand would have been futile. DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1; see also Aronson v. Lewis, 473 
A.2d 805, 814–15 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 253 (Del. 
2000). For further descriptions of the review of derivative claims under a Rule 23.1 motion to dismiss, 
see Brehm, 746 A.2d at 249; Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 934 (Del. 1993); Grobow v. Perot, 539 
A.2d 180, 187 (Del. 1988), overruled on other grounds by Brehm, 746 A.2d at 253; Aronson, 473 A.2d 
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fiduciary duty claims against the officer on Rule 23.1 grounds, nine 
opinions denied the motion, and six opinions dismissed the claims on 
grounds other than Rule 23.1.113 
The high rate of dismissal of officer claims in the derivative 
context is expected given the demand excusal requirements under 
Chancery Court Rule 23.1 and case law interpreting that rule. As set 
forth by the Delaware Supreme Court in Rales v. Blasband, in order 
to show demand futility, a plaintiff must present the court with 
“particularized factual allegations . . . creat[ing] a reasonable doubt 
that, as of the time the complaint is filed, the board of directors could 
have properly exercised its independent and disinterested business 
judgment in responding to a demand.”114 As detailed in prior work, 
satisfying this burden is especially difficult when one is challenging 
officer conduct and not director conduct.115 
Two examples that illustrate the challenge stockholders face in 
bringing derivative fiduciary duty claims against officers are 
Desimone v. Barrows and In re Sanchez Energy Derivative 
Litigation.116 In Desimone, a stockholder challenged allegedly 
improper option grants made to the officers of the corporation.117 As 
the court explained, in order for the stockholder’s claim to survive 
the motion to dismiss for failure to make a demand on the board, “the 
relevant inquiry is whether the Sycamore board, as constituted at the 
time Desimone brought suit, could exercise an independent and 
disinterested business judgment in responding to a demand regarding 
                                                                                                                 
at 814–16. 
 113. There was also one opinion where the court was addressing a motion to compel before the 
motion to dismiss. In that case the motion to compel was granted. 
 114. Rales, 634 A.2d at 934; see also DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1. In satisfying this burden, a plaintiff must 
show more than just deferential board behavior, but an inability to exercise independent judgment by a 
majority of the board. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 816 (stating that “[t]he shorthand shibboleth of 
‘dominated and controlled directors’ is insufficient” to excuse demand); BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra 
note 13, at § 13.14[B] (“[A]n unsupported allegation of domination and control of directors by one 
interested in the transaction is insufficient to demonstrate demand futility.”). 
 115. See Shaner, The (Un)Enforcement, supra note 3, at 314 n.187, 315 (describing the difficulty of 
surviving Rule 23.1 motions to dismiss). 
 116. Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 914 (Del. Ch. 2007); In re Sanchez Energy Derivative 
Litig., No. 9132-VCG, 2014 WL 6673895, at *13 (Del. Ch. Nov. 25, 2014); see also Highland Legacy 
Ltd. v. Singer, No. Civ.A.1566-N, 2006 WL 741939, at *8 (Del. Ch. Mar. 17, 2006). 
 117. Desimone, 924 A.2d at 913. 
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Desimone’s claims.”118 Because none of the board members received 
the challenged option grants, and Desimone was unable to show that 
members of the board knowingly approved improperly back-dated or 
spring-loaded options, the court granted the motion to dismiss.119 
Similarly, in In re Sanchez, the court dismissed the fiduciary claims 
against the officer-defendant because the stockholder was unable to 
show that the board was sufficiently interested and/or not 
independent from the officer and his actions such that the board 
would be unable to consider a demand to file suit against the 
officer.120 Thus, the outcomes of derivative claims are consistent with 
scholars’ assertions that derivative litigation’s significant procedural 
hurdles impede enforcement of officer fiduciary duties.121 
III. INTERPRETATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
A. The State of Officer Fiduciary Duty Doctrine 
Until 2009, there was considerable speculation about the exact 
fiduciary obligations of corporate officers. The Delaware Supreme 
Court in Gantler v. Stephens remedied some of the uncertainty in this 
area of law by holding that “officers of Delaware corporations, like 
directors, owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty, and . . . the 
fiduciary duties of officers are the same as those of directors.”122 The 
remainder of the court’s opinion discussing the specific allegations 
before it, however, focused only on the officers’ breach of their duty 
of loyalty.123 This still leaves many open issues surrounding officer 
fiduciary obligations.124 Since Gantler, the Delaware courts’ 
jurisprudence on the role and responsibilities of officers has been 
                                                                                                                 
 118. Id. at 914. 
 119. Id. at 951. 
 120. In re Sanchez, 2014 WL 6673895, at *6, *9. 
 121. See, e.g., Shaner, The (Un)Enforcement, supra note 3, at 314 n.187, 315. 
 122. Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708–09 (Del. 2009). 
 123. See generally id. 
 124. See Lyman Johnson & Dennis Garvis, Are Corporate Officers Advised About Fiduciary Duties?, 
64 BUS. LAW. 1105, 1108 (2009) (discussing the outstanding issues following Gantler and stating that 
“[c]learly the area of officer duties remains murkier than that of director duties”); J. Travis Laster & 
Steven M. Haas, Delaware Supreme Court Establishes Clear Rules in Gantler Decision, INSIGHTS: 
CORP. & SEC. L. ADVISOR, Mar. 2009, at 8. 
32
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 2
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol32/iss2/2
2016] OFFICER ACCOUNTABILITY 389 
scant and fragmented, with seemingly little expansion in this 
concededly important area of corporate governance.125 Accordingly, 
this part of the article attempts to collect and synthesize the courts’ 
scattered declarations on the law surrounding officer duties in an 
effort to gain a clearer picture of the current state of officer fiduciary 
duty doctrine. 
On its face, the language in Gantler suggests that officer fiduciary 
duties import all of the existing law surrounding director fiduciary 
duties.126 Under Delaware law, directors owe fiduciary duties of care 
and loyalty.127 An officer’s duty of care appears to mirror that of 
directors: “[g]enerally, like directors, [the officer-defendants] were 
expected to . . . use the amount of care that a reasonably prudent 
person would use in similar circumstances (i.e., to fulfill their duty of 
care).”128 Similarly, the descriptions of an officer’s duty of loyalty 
(which includes good faith) are taken from director fiduciary case 
                                                                                                                 
 125. See D. QUINN MILLS, WHEEL, DEAL, AND STEAL: DECEPTIVE ACCOUNTING, DECEITFUL CEOS, 
AND INEFFECTIVE REFORMS 183 (2003) (stating that “the core problem faced by investors today, as 
revealed by corporate scandals, is that investors must be better protected from [officers]”); Johnson & 
Ricca, supra note 27, at 82 (“Of the three main actors in corporate governance (shareholders, directors, 
and officers), the officers clearly continue to reign supreme.”); cf. In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder 
Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1003 (Del. Ch. 2005) (“It is, of course, true that most examples of malfeasance by 
corporate fiduciaries involve officers who exploit their superior knowledge, power, and influence to 
extract value from the corporation at the expense of its stockholders.”). The court’s restraint and 
superficial use of precedent in discussing officer issues is discussed more fully in Part III.B. 
 126. See generally Gantler, 965 A.2d 695. 
 127. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 749–51 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906 
A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).  
  Relatedly, the issue of to whom do officers owe their fiduciary obligations is important. 
Language in the case law suggests that officers owe duties to the corporation and its stockholders, 
thereby giving stockholders the ability to sue directly and derivatively to enforce those duties. See In re 
Comverge, Inc., No. 7368-VCP, 2014 WL 6686570, at *8 n.19 (Del. Ch. Nov. 25, 2014) (“Under settled 
Delaware law, however, ‘“[f]iduciary duties are owed by the directors and officers to the corporation 
and its stockholders.” In other words, a corporation does not owe fiduciary duties to its stockholders.’”) 
(internal citations omitted) (emphasis added); In re Nine Sys. Corp. S’holder Litig., No. 3940-VCN, 
2014 WL 4383127, at *57 (Del. Ch. Sept. 4, 2014) (“Under Delaware law, a corporation does not owe 
fiduciary duties to its stockholders; the board of directors and the officers do.”) (emphasis added); cf. 
Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 906 A.2d 168, 203 n.96 (Del. Ch. 2006) (stating that 
officers owe fiduciary duties to creditors). 
 128. Hampshire Grp., Ltd. v. Kuttner, No. 3607-VCS, 2010 WL 2739995, at *11 (Del. Ch. July 12, 
2010). Importantly, the standard of liability for the duty of care for officers is an open issue. Compare 
Johnson & Millon, supra note 45, at 1633 (asserting ordinary negligence is the standard), with 
Hamermesh & Sparks, supra note 100, at 868 (asserting gross negligence is the standard); see also 
Hampshire Grp., 2010 WL 2739995, at *11 (declining from ruling on the proper standard of care 
liability but noting that the parties agreed to apply gross negligence). 
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law: “[a]n officer[‘s] . . . duty of loyalty requires [him or her] 
scrupulously to place the interests of the corporation and 
shareholders that they serve before their own.”129 
The respective roles of directors and officers in the corporation are 
not, however, identical. A close look at the courts’ discussion 
surrounding officer duties seems to take this into account and fashion 
fiduciary obligations in a substantially similar, but not identical, 
manner.130 A more specific tailoring of fiduciary duties is apparent in 
discussions pertaining to the other duties that are components of care 
and loyalty, such as disclosure and oversight.131 With respect to the 
duty of disclosure, an officer is often akin to an agent, as opposed to 
a director.132 Accordingly, an officer’s duty changes with respect to 
the circumstances—perhaps a broader range of times than directors—
                                                                                                                 
 129. TVI Corp. v. Gallagher, No. 7798-VCP, 2013 WL 5809271, at *25 (Del. Ch. Oct. 28, 2013) 
(citing to director duty of loyalty cases). The settings in which an officer’s duty of loyalty has been most 
often examined include misuse of corporate assets (including corporate opportunities), compensation, 
and self-dealing in transaction negotiations. See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of 
Integrated Health Svcs., Inc. v. Elkins, No. Civ.A 20228-NC, 2004 WL 1949290, at *16–17 (Del. Ch. 
Aug. 24, 2014) (compensation); QC Commc’ns Inc. v. Quartarone, No. 8218-VCG, 2014 WL 3974525, 
at *11–12 (Del. Ch. Aug. 15, 2014) (misuse of corporate assets); Dweck v. Nasser, No. 1353-VCL, 
2012 WL 161590, at *12–13 (Del. Ch. Jan. 18, 2012) (corporate opportunity); La. Mun. Police Emps. 
Ret. Sys. v. Fertitta, No. 4339-VCL, 2009 WL 2263406, at *7 (Del. Ch. July 28, 2009) (negotiation of 
financing). 
 130. See Hampshire Grp., 2010 WL 2739995, at *11; Frank v. Elgamal, No. 6120-VCN, 2014 WL 
957550, at *20 (Del. Ch. Mar. 10, 2014) (“Under Delaware law, the individuals who owe fiduciary 
duties to a corporation and its stockholders are the corporation’s directors and, to a similar extent, 
officers.”) (emphasis added). 
 131. MCG Capital Corp. v. Maginn, No. 4521-CC, 2010 WL 1782271, at *12 n.68 (Del. Ch. May 5, 
2010) (discussing duty to disclose to the board). 
  Further examples of the recognition of the unique role of officers and a conforming adjustment 
of fiduciary duties include officer actions in conducting a stockholders’ meeting and the receipt and 
exercise of stock options. See, e.g., Portnoy v. Cryo-Cell Int’l, Inc., 940 A.2d 43, 73–76 (Del. Ch. 2008) 
(conduct at a meeting); Weiss v. Swanson, 948 A.2d 433, 448 (Del. Ch. 2008) (discussing stock 
options); Ryan v. Gifford, 935 A.2d 258, 269–70 (Del. Ch. 2007) (discussing the different scenarios in 
which receipt of stock options could violate officers’ fiduciary duties or not). 
 132. There are, however, times when an officer should be treated like a director for disclosure 
requirements. See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Martha’s (and Steve’s) Good Faith: An Officer’s Duty of 
Loyalty at the Intersection of Good Faith and Candor, 11 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 111 (2009) 
(discussing a corporate officer’s disclosures of personal facts under state corporate law); Joan MacLeod 
Heminway, Personal Facts About Executive Officers: A Proposal for Tailored Disclosures to 
Encourage Reasonable Investor Behavior, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 749 (2007) (discussing disclosure 
requirements for executive officers under federal securities law). 
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and to whom—the board more so than stockholders—the obligation 
is triggered.133 
Another example is the courts’ discussions of the duty of 
oversight. As applied to officers, language in the relevant opinions 
indicate a duty to monitor the individuals and business of the 
corporation under their control similar to that of directors.134 On the 
other hand, courts have recognized the difficulty associated with 
enforcing a duty against an officer, who is also a director, that 
requires oversight and reporting on the officer’s own actions.135 In 
light of the differences between officers’ and directors’ roles and the 
corresponding impact they have on the contours of fiduciary 
obligations, further delineation of officer duties—as opposed to 
reliance on directorial fiduciary doctrine to fill in the gaps of officers’ 
fiduciary duties—is still needed. 
While Gantler may have addressed the standard of conduct for 
officers, it did not address the standard of review.136 In analyzing 
compliance with fiduciary obligations, Delaware law makes a 
distinction between the standard of conduct and the standard of 
review. The former pertains to the content of fiduciary duties 
discussed above, while the latter involves the standard of review a 
court will apply in determining whether a director or officer is liable 
for breaching a fiduciary duty.137 When evaluating director action, 
                                                                                                                 
 133. See Hampshire Grp., 2010 WL 2739995, at *13 (discussing the “contextual obligations” of 
officers and the responsibility to disclose to superior officers or principals); see also MCG Capital 
Corp., 2010 WL 1782271, at *12 n.68. 
 134. See, e.g., Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. v. Greenberg, 965 A.2d 763, 788–99 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 135. See Canadian Commercial Workers Indus. Pension Plan v. Alden, No. Civ.A.1184, 2006 WL 
456786, at *7 (Del. Ch. Feb. 22, 2006). 
 136. See Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648, 666 n.2 (Del. Ch. 2014). 
 137. See Quadrant Structured Prods. Co. v. Vertin, 102 A.3d 155, 171–72 (Del. Ch. 2014) (“When 
determining whether directors have breached their fiduciary duties, Delaware corporate law 
distinguishes between the standard of conduct and the standard of review. ‘The standard of conduct 
describes what directors are expected to do and is defined by the content of the duties of loyalty and 
care. The standard of review is the test that a court applies when evaluating whether directors have met 
the standard of conduct.’”) (internal citations omitted); Eisenberg, supra note 63, at 437; see also 
William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs, & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Realigning the Standard of Review of Director 
Due Care with Delaware Public Policy: A Critique of Van Gorkom and its Progeny as a Standard of 
Review Problem, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 449, 451–52 (2002); William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs, & Leo E. 
Strine, Jr., Function Over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 
56 BUS. LAW. 1287, 1295–99 (2001); E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened 
in Delaware Corporate Law and Governance from 1992–2004? A Retrospective on Some Key 
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scholars have classified judicial review as occurring under one of six 
standards: the business judgment rule, entire fairness, Revlon’s 
enhanced scrutiny, Unocal’s intermediate scrutiny, Blasius, or 
Schnell.138 To what extent these standards of review developed for 
evaluating director action should similarly apply to officers is still 
largely an open issue.139 
There is, however, language in the courts’ opinions signaling an 
answer with respect to certain standards of review. First, there is 
broad language in decisions from the Court of Chancery that can be 
read to suggest that directors and officers alike are entitled to 
business judgment rule deference.140 Second, language in the Court 
of Chancery’s opinions in the M&A context intimate that officers, at 
least those officers charged with negotiating a transaction, owe 
Revlon duties like directors to seek the highest value possible for 
stockholders.141 In both of these instances, the court’s language 
                                                                                                                 
Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1416–25 (2005) (distinguishing between the standards of 
fiduciary conduct and standards of review). 
 138. See Mary Siegel, The Illusion of Enhanced Review of Board Action, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 599, 
600 (2013); see also Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 89 (Del. 2001); Chen, 87 A.3d at 666–67; 
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa 
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971); 
Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 663 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
 139. See Hampshire Grp., Ltd. v. Kuttner, No. 3607-VCS, 2010 WL 2739995, at *11 (Del. Ch. July 
12, 2010) (“There are important and interesting questions about the extent to which officers and 
employees should be more or less exposed to liability for breach of fiduciary duty than corporate 
directors.”). For an example of the debate over the appropriate standard of review for officer conduct, 
compare Hamermesh & Sparks, supra note 100, at 865, and Sparks & Hamermesh, supra note 52, at 
215, with Johnson, supra note 100, at 439. Relatedly, where directorial and officer fiduciary standards 
of conduct and standards of review diverge, the courts and legal counsel will need to be sensitive to 
differentiating actions taken in an individual’s officer capacity versus director capacity. See, e.g., In re 
Delphi Fin. Grp. S’holder Litig., No. 7144-VCG, 2012 WL 729232, at *3 (Del. Ch. Mar. 6, 2012) 
(differentiating between defendants’ officer and director roles). 
 140. See, e.g., In re Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 5215-VCG, 2011 WL 4826104, at 
*1 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2011) (stating that so long as directors and officers “act within the boundaries of 
their fiduciary duties, judges are ill-suited . . . to secondguess [sic] the business decisions” of them); id. 
at *23 (“The Delaware General Corporation law affords directors and officers broad discretion to 
exercise their business judgment in the fulfillment of their obligations to the corporation.”). But cf. In re 
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 46 n.38 (Del. 2006) (barring the argument that officers 
were not protected by the business judgment rule on procedural grounds without ruling on the merits of 
the argument). 
 141. See, e.g., In re Delphi, 2012 WL 739232, at *3; In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 
439, 443 (Del. Ch. 2012). Even when not explicitly citing to Revlon in evaluating an officer’s conduct, 
the court uses Revlon-like language, referencing a duty to seek the best price available for stockholders. 
See, e.g., In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d at 444 (stating that it was both the CEO’s and the 
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provides a tentative basis to assert that officer conduct is subject to 
the same standard of review as director conduct. Finally, the court 
has found that where a director or an officer has engaged in self-
interested decision-making, the decisions in both instances will be 
subject to entire fairness review.142 In contrast to the first two 
standards of review, the court’s language regarding entire fairness 
indicates with more certainty that it applies equally to officers and 
directors. 
Despite the underdeveloped judicial standards of conduct and 
standards of review for officer fiduciary duties, the courts have more 
directly addressed other related matters. One such example is the 
application of exculpation to officer conduct. As both Section 
102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law and the 
Delaware courts make clear, despite owing similar fiduciary duties, 
officers of Delaware corporations do not enjoy the protection of an 
exculpatory provision in a corporation’s charter.143 Where 
complexity can arise, however, is in trying to untangle to what extent 
exculpatory provisions protect officer-directors.144 Another area of 
relative clarity is jurisdiction over officers for their fiduciary duty 
breaches. Section 3114(b) of the Delaware Code provides for 
personal jurisdiction over certain non-resident officers for their 
conduct as officers of a Delaware corporation.145 In applying the 
statute to officers, the courts have made clear that prior case law 
interpreting the director consent statute, Section 3114(a), applies 
                                                                                                                 
board’s duty “to squeeze the last drop of the lemon out for [the] stockholders”). 
 142. See Hampshire Grp., 2010 WL 2739995, at *12; Valeant Pharm. Int’l v. Jerney, 921 A.2d 732, 
745–46 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
 143. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2006) (authorizing “a provision eliminating or limiting 
the personal liability of a director to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach 
of fiduciary duty as a director”); Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 709 n.37 (Del. 2009) (“Although 
legislatively possible, there currently is no statutory provision authorizing comparable exculpation of 
corporate officers.”); Chen, 87 A.3d at 666; McPadden v. Sidhu, 964 A.2d 1262, 1273 (Del. Ch. 2008) 
(“Dubreville, though he, as an officer, owes the same duties to the Company as the Director Defendants, 
does not benefit from the same protections as the Director Defendants because the section 102(b)(7) 
provision operates to exculpate only directors, not officers.”). 
 144. See In re Celera Corp. S’holder Litig., No. 6304-VCP, 2012 WL 1020471, at *27 n.191 (Del. 
Ch. Mar. 23, 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 59 A.3d 418 (Del. 2012); Prod. Res. Grp., L.L.C. v. 
NCT Grp., Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 799 n.82 (Del. Ch. 2004) (“The question of to what extent § 102(b)(7) 
would protect these officer-directors is a complex one.”). 
 145. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114 (2006). 
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equally to the officer consent statute.146 This means that Section 
3114(b) has a limited scope in granting Delaware courts jurisdiction 
over officers. First, the claims brought against an officer must be 
related to actions in his or her officer capacity and must involve 
alleged violations of the Delaware General Corporation Law, charter, 
bylaws, breaches of fiduciary duty, or any combination of the 
aforementioned.147 Second, the alleged wrongful conduct on which 
the cause of action is based must have occurred after the adoption of 
Section 3114(b).148 
B. Restraint and Established Legal Principles 
The Delaware Supreme Court’s Gantler decision laid the 
groundwork for future development of officer fiduciary doctrine. As 
discussed above, post-Gantler decisions have sparingly added to its 
initial principles. Indeed, Delaware courts have acknowledged that 
there are still several “important and interesting questions” with 
respect to officer fiduciary duties and the appropriate standards of 
liability.149 Contributing to the slow development of the law is 
restraint by the courts in delving into issues surrounding officer 
conduct and, relatedly, the superficial use of precedent. Almost all 
post-Gantler decisions that address officer fiduciary duties in any 
meaningful way cite to the same language in the opinion for 
support.150 While citing to Gantler is warranted because it is the 
                                                                                                                 
 146. Ryan v. Gifford, 935 A.2d 258, 266 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“The enactment of section 3114(b) carried 
with it the interpretive ‘baggage’ of section 3114(a), which I am bound to follow.”). 
 147. See Corp. Prop. Assocs. 14 Inc. v. CHR Holding Corp., No. 3231-VCS, 2008 WL 963048, at 
*10 (Del. Ch. Apr. 10, 2008). 
 148. See Ryan, 935 A.2d at 266; see also Teachers’ Ret. Sys. of La. v. Scrushy, No. Civ.A. 20529, 
2004 WL 423122, at *10 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 2004) (stating that the court cannot exercise personal 
jurisdiction over acts by former officers that pre-date the statute). 
 149. Hampshire Grp., Ltd. v. Kuttner, No. 3607-VCS, 2010 WL 2739995, at *11 (Del. Ch. July 12, 
2010). 
 150. See, e.g., Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648, 686–87 (Del. Ch. 2014); Higher Educ. Mgmt. 
Grp., Inc. v. Matthews, No. 9110-VCP, 2014 WL 5573325, at *13 (Del. Ch. Nov. 3, 2014); QC 
Commc’ns Inc. v. Quartarone, No. 8218-VCG, 2014 WL 3974525, at *11 (Del. Ch. Aug. 15, 2014); In 
re Wayport, Inc. Litig., 76 A.3d 296, 322 (Del. Ch. 2013); In re Celera Corp. S’holder Litig., No. 6304-
VCP, 2012 WL 1020471, at *27–28 (Del. Ch. Mar. 23, 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 59 A.3d 418 
(Del. 2012); Dweck v. Nasser, No. 1353-VCL, 2012 WL 161590, at *12 (Del. Ch. Jan. 18, 2012); Beard 
Research, Inc. v. Kates, 8 A.3d 573, 601 n.181 (Del. Ch. 2010); Hampshire Grp., 2010 WL 2739995, at 
*11 n.75. 
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Delaware Supreme Court’s first definitive statement on the topic, 
many times the court simply cites back to that decision without any 
further discussion of the legal principles surrounding it.151 This is, in 
many ways, similar to the historical development of fiduciary duties 
of officers in Delaware. Before Gantler, the Delaware courts 
referenced officer duties only in passing, citing broad statements 
from Guth v. Loft as precedential support for the idea that officers 
owe fiduciary duties without any further explication.152 Such a 
pattern in the courts’ jurisprudence, however, leads to a stagnation in 
this area of the law. 
Further contributing to an apparent stalling in the development of 
officer fiduciary doctrine is the Delaware courts’ exercise of judicial 
restraint. This is not to criticize the courts. A court should limit itself 
to the issues appropriately brought before it and refrain from 
engaging in speculation or discussions of matters outside that 
scope.153 Judicial restraint in officer fiduciary doctrine is thus a result 
of the parties failing to raise officer fiduciary issues. Again, the 
Delaware courts recognize this problem in officer litigation, making 
statements in their opinions that can be characterized as invitations to 
the parties to bring these important matters before the court so that 
they may be adequately addressed.154 
Plaintiffs and their legal arguments largely explain the superficial 
use of precedent and restraint in officer fiduciary case law. The lack 
                                                                                                                 
 151. See, e.g., Hampshire Grp., Ltd., 2010 WL 2739995, at *11. 
 152. See Shaner, Restoring the Balance, supra note 3, at 31–33 (“This is typical of the chancery 
court’s treatment of the issue pre-Gantler; references to similar language appear in a number of 
chancery court opinions, most of which simply cite the sweeping language from Guth as precedential 
support without any further explication.”). 
 153. See In re Tyson Foods, Inc. Consol. S’holder Litig., No. Civ.A. 1106-CC, 2007 WL 2351071, at 
*1 (Del. Ch. Aug. 15, 2007) (“Judicial restraint suggests that a court should limit itself to the case or 
controversy placed before it and, to the extent practicable, not engage in speculation about phantasmal 
parties or issues that might one day appear.”). 
 154. See, e.g., Chen, 87 A.3d at 666 n.2 (“A lively debate exists regarding the degree to which 
decisions by officers should be examined using the same standards of review developed for directors. 
Given how the parties have chosen to proceed, this decision need not weigh in on these issues and 
intimates no view upon them.”) (internal citations omitted); Hampshire Grp., Ltd., 2010 WL 2739995, 
at *11 (“There are important and interesting questions about the extent to which officers and employees 
should be more or less exposed to liability for breach of fiduciary duty than corporate directors. The 
parties in this case have not delved into any of those issues, and I see no justifiable reason for me to do 
so myself.”). 
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of certainty and predictability in this area of the law leads many 
plaintiffs to avoid officer fiduciary issues in favor of claims founded 
on better-developed statutory or decisional law.155 Officer suits 
involving these established causes of action and, as discussed in Part 
C below, plaintiffs’ preference to sue directors over officers 
whenever possible, demonstrate plaintiffs’ dependency on 
established legal principles. As to the former, based on the cases 
reviewed for this article, a majority of legal actions against corporate 
officers that plaintiffs’ pursued beyond the motion to dismiss stage 
involve a few, distinct, types of claims: usurpation of corporate 
opportunities, state law insider trading, compensation, and improper 
use of corporate assets.156 All of these claims are based on legal 
principles that were well established in the case law even before the 
Gantler decision. The seminal corporate opportunity case, Guth v. 
Loft for example, was decided in 1939.157 Over the years, the 
contours of the corporate opportunity doctrine and its application to 
officers have been developed and tested by the courts. Likewise, 
insider trading claims based on state law were established in 
Delaware in 1949 in Brophy v. Cities Service Co., and have also been 
further developed over the years.158 In both of these areas, the legal 
principles governing an individual’s conduct and liability are well 
developed, and therefore, provide plaintiffs and their counsel with the 
benefit of more predictability in the litigation. 
In sum, to the extent that plaintiffs are seeking to hold officers 
accountable for their conduct, they are pursuing more established 
avenues of legal liability.159 The result of this litigation strategy by 
                                                                                                                 
 155. Cf. Cheffins et al., supra note 62, at 432 (“Plaintiffs’ lawyers largely determine which lawsuits 
are brought and where.”). 
 156. The research yielded ten opinions that were issued post-trial and twelve opinions that were 
addressing motions for summary judgment. Of those twenty-two opinions, approximately three-quarters 
of them involved at least one claim against an officer that fell into one of these categories. 
 157. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 508 (Del. 1939); see also Gen. Video Corp. v. Kertesz, No. 1922-
VCL., 2008 WL 5247120, at *18 (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2008) (“The best known statement of the corporate 
opportunity doctrine is taken from the venerable cause of Guth v. Loft, Inc.”). 
 158. Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 70 A.2d 5, 7 (Del. Ch. 1949); see In re Oracle Corp., 867 A.2d 904, 
925 (Del. Ch. 2004) (“This type of claim is a state version of a federal insider trading claim and has its 
origins in Delaware law in the venerable case of Brophy . . . .”); id. at 929–34 (setting forth the elements 
of a Brophy claim). 
 159. Alternatively, or additionally, these may also be characterized as instances where there is more at 
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plaintiffs is that there is no need (or opportunity) for the courts to 
provide guidance with respect to officer fiduciary duties. This 
creates, of course, a “chicken and egg” problem. Fiduciary duties are 
a creature of common law. Thus, the court only may develop and 
clarify fiduciary duties if plaintiffs bring those issues before the 
court. If, however, plaintiffs are refraining from raising officer 
fiduciary issues because of the absence of guidance from the court, 
there will be no occasion for the court to provide such guidance. 
C. Preference for Director Accountability160 
Another interpretation of the limited number of cases alleging 
officer breaches of fiduciary duty is that they evidence a preference 
for holding directors accountable for their misconduct while 
excluding similarly misbehaving officers. In contrast to directors, 
who are subject to numerous fiduciary suits each year, officers are 
rarely the defendants in such litigation. In M&A litigation, for 
example, there appears to be a strong director preference.161 
According to a recent study in 2013, 97.5% of M&A transactions that 
targeted U.S. public corporations where the value of the transaction 
was more than $100 million and the offer price was at least $5 per 
share were subject to a stockholder lawsuit.162 In virtually all of these 
                                                                                                                 
stake for the party injured by the officer conduct and thus the plaintiff(s) are more willing to pursue their 
claims. See Quinn Curtis & Minor Myers, Do the Merits Matter? Evidence from Options Backdating 
Litigation, 164 U. PA. L. REV (forthcoming) (finding that plaintiffs’ attorneys selected corporations with 
more egregious patterns to pursue legal claims) (manuscript on file with author). 
 160. In a forthcoming paper, I analyze more extensively the apparent “director preference” in 
stockholder litigation. See Megan Wischmeier Shaner, Legal Agency Costs: Our Preference to Sue 
Directors (manuscript on file with author). 
 161. See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 54, at 1761 (finding M&A litigation to be the dominant 
form of stockholder litigation). Using the findings in the M&A litigation context as illustrative of what 
may be going on in fiduciary duty litigation generally is apt as scholars have found that M&A litigation 
is the dominant form of corporate litigation and that it almost always includes fiduciary duty issues. Id. 
See also ROBERT M. DAINES & OLGA KOUMRIAN, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SHAREHOLDER 
LITIGATION INVOLVING MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS (2012), http://securities.stanford.edu/research-
reports/1996-2012/Cornerstone-Research-Shareholder-MandA-Litigation-03-2012.pdf; Cain & 
Soloman, A Great Game, supra note 76, at 468 (“This litigation almost always raises fiduciary duty 
issues and other important corporate law issues.”). 
 162. Cain & Davidoff, Takeover Litigation, supra note 76, at 2. 
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lawsuits, directors were named as defendants and breach of fiduciary 
duty claims were included.163 
Many times, however, officers also play a central role in M&A 
transactions. It is well-established that CEOs and other senior 
executive officers are not only heavily involved in negotiating these 
transactions, but also often negotiate in a self-interested manner to 
extract individual benefits.164 Despite these facts, few M&A suits 
include allegations related to self-interested officer conduct, focusing 
instead only on the actions of the board of directors. More precisely, 
as shown in Figure 2, only 20 of the opinions referencing any claim 
for breach of fiduciary duty brought against an officer occur in the 
M&A context.165 Moreover, in cases involving an officer who is also 
a director of a corporation, the focus of the allegations in the suit 
focused primarily on the individual’s conduct in his or her director, 
but not officer, role.166 
There are several possible explanations for the apparent preference 
to sue directors to the exclusion of the officers. The first is that 
plaintiffs’ attorneys are simply overlooking officers and their role in 
the corporation.167 One notable example of this appearing to happen 
is the Disney litigation, where the plaintiffs did not attempt to argue 
for a stricter standard against the defendants for actions taken in their 
                                                                                                                 
 163. See id. at 3 (“In plain English, if a target announces a takeover it should assume that it and its 
directors will be sued.”). 
 164. See, e.g., Jay C. Hartzell et al., What’s in It for Me? CEOs Whose Firms Are Acquired, 17 REV. 
FIN. STUD. 37, 51–56 (2004) (finding target management exchange lower premiums for generous 
compensations packages); Julie Wulf, Do CEOs in Mergers Trade Power for Premium? Evidence from 
“Mergers of Equals”, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 60, 94 (2004) (finding target management exchanges lower 
premiums for employment in the surviving entity); see also Donald C. Langevoort, The Behavioral 
Economics of Mergers and Acquisitions, 12 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 65, 71–72 (2011) 
(describing CEO overconfidence in M&A activity and also stating that “[o]verconfidence leads to 
diminished risk perception”); Lin, supra note 9, at 1386 (describing studies that suggest that high-
statured individuals like executive officers are more inclined to engage in unethical and risky behavior). 
 165. See Figure 2. 
 166. See, e.g., In re Novell, Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 6032-VCN, 2013 WL 322560, at *8 (Del. Ch. 
Jan. 3, 2013) (focusing on director actions even though one director, who was also the CEO, negotiated 
the deal in an alleged self-interested manner). 
 167. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 45, at 1612 (asserting that officers are forgotten fiduciaries in 
part because of (i) the lack of appreciation by plaintiffs’ attorneys, boards of directors, and judges for 
the distinctive fiduciary obligations of these individuals, and (ii) lawyers do not fully appreciate the 
fiduciary duties of officers as agents of the corporation because law schools devote less time and 
attention to agency law principles). 
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officer (as opposed to director) capacity until they appealed the 
Chancery Court’s decision to the Delaware Supreme Court.168 Before 
that point in time, “[t]he parties essentially treat[ed] both officers and 
directors as comparable fiduciaries” and had not attempted to 
distinguish between the defendants (or their actions) as directors 
versus officers.169 
Another possible reason for a director preference is that it is a 
strategic choice by plaintiffs’ attorneys to focus their time and energy 
on holding directors responsible for their actions. Where there is both 
board and officer misconduct, it is arguably easier to succeed when 
suing the directors as opposed to the officers. First, the case law 
outlining the duties of directors is better established than the scant 
guidance on officer fiduciary obligations.170 This means that lawyers 
must speculate as to the exact nature and scope of officer fiduciary 
duties, as well as how much liability might accompany a breach of 
those duties. Second, there is significantly more documentation 
surrounding board actions and decisions than officer conduct (for 
example, board resolutions, board consents, and board meeting 
minutes).171 As a result, from an evidentiary standpoint, it may be 
easier to prove director breaches than officer breaches.172 
                                                                                                                 
 168. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 46 n.38 (Del. 2006) (rejecting the 
plaintiffs’ officer argument on procedural grounds). 
 169. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 777 n.588 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906 
A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). 
 170. See, e.g., BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 13, at § 4.10[C] (“Few authorities deal with the 
nature of the obligation owed by officers to the corporation and its stockholders.”); Johnson & Millon, 
supra note 45, at 1601 (“Hardly a week goes by without yet another Delaware decision addressing the 
subject of director duties. Yet, surprisingly, no Delaware decision has ever clearly articulated the subject 
of officers duties and judicial standards for reviewing their discharge.”); Sparks & Hamermesh, supra 
note 52, at 215 (“The precise nature of the duties and liabilities of corporate officers who are not 
directors is a topic that has received little attention from courts and commentators.”); Shaner, Restoring 
the Balance, supra note 3, at 29 (“[T]he exact nature and scope of an officer’s fiduciary obligations 
were left virtually untouched by the Delaware courts and legislature for almost seventy years, despite 
Delaware’s otherwise vast and well-developed body of corporate law.”). 
 171. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(f) (2006) (providing for director written consent); 
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT. § 16.01 (2006) (providing for specific corporate records). Additionally, 
ultimate responsibility for the business and affairs resides with the board, making them a prime target in 
litigation. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2006). 
 172. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (2006) (providing stockholders with books and records 
inspection rights). Access to this documentation through books and records inspection rights also make 
proving director conduct easier than officer conduct. See id. 
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Third, the combination of more established director fiduciary case 
law and evidentiary advantages surrounding director decision-
making, when taken in the context of derivative litigation and the 
procedural hurdles that accompany it, make it more likely that a 
stockholder-plaintiff will survive a Rule 23.1 motion to dismiss for 
failure to make a demand when challenging the actions of the 
board.173 Finally, the type of relief a plaintiff is seeking can impact 
who is named as a defendant in fiduciary litigation. While damages 
can be sought against directors and officers alike, injunctive relief to 
stop corporate action will typically be sought only against the board 
of directors. 
In light of these possible explanations, a director preference is 
understandable and perhaps even justified. Nevertheless, the actions 
of officers should not be ignored and left unchecked. 
IV. LONG-TERM CONSIDERATIONS 
At the root of this article and prior officer accountability 
scholarship is a more fundamental question that has yet to be 
squarely addressed—In what context(s) should officer accountability 
for fiduciary duties occur?174 There are several different fora where 
formal officer accountability can occur. State courts, bankruptcy 
courts, intra-corporate proceedings, private federal securities actions, 
and SEC proceedings are some of the main ones.175 In addition, while 
                                                                                                                 
 173. See Shaner, The (Un)Enforcement, supra note 3, at 314 n.187 (describing the difficulties of 
showing demand excused under Aronson and Rales when the actions of officers and not directors are 
being challenged). 
 174. See Donald C. Langevoort, On Leaving Corporate Executives “Naked, Homeless and Without 
Wheels”: Corporate Fraud, Equitable Remedies, and the Debate over Entity Versus Individual Liability, 
42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 627, 630 (2007) (“Dishonest executives are undoubtedly subject to serious 
sanction; the question is only how and by whom those executives are sanctioned.”). 
  This question is more nuanced than just “in what context(s) should officer accountability for 
fiduciary duties occur,” including considerations such as when accountability should occur in a specific 
context(s), and how such accountability should occur. Acknowledging these nuances, I pose the 
question more broadly as an invitation for future research and discussion into the issues surrounding 
officer fiduciary duty accountability. 
 175. Id. (“There are many potential sources of sanction: federal and state, civil and criminal, private 
and public, or legal and extra-legal.”); ABA REPORT, supra note 6, at 125 (“[D]irectors and officers are 
exposed to broad potential liability as fiduciaries (and under other laws including, but not limited to, the 
federal securities laws and employment laws).”). 
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beyond the scope of this article, there are many different types of 
informal or extra-legal sanctioning of officer conduct.176 This section 
provides an overview of some of the considerations involved in 
answering this important question with respect to the formal venues 
for officer fiduciary duty accountability. 
The answer to “in which context(s) should officer fiduciary duty 
accountability occur?” will vary depending on one’s objective. For 
example, if you approach this question from a corporate efficiency 
perspective,177 intra-corporate accountability may be the best venue 
to discipline officers. Corporate statutes say very little with respect to 
the power, authority, and duties of officers, leaving such task to the 
corporation’s organizational documents and board of directors.178 
The board of directors thus has expansive legal authority to regulate 
officer conduct. Indeed, the board is the principal actor responsible 
for the hiring, firing, delegation, compensation, directing, and 
oversight of corporate officers.179 Boards of directors can make use 
of intra-corporate sanctioning, in substitution for or as a supplement 
to stockholder requests for judicial relief for fiduciary duty breaches, 
as a means of holding officers accountable. Types of intra-corporate 
sanctions include termination, demotion, reprimand (public or 
private), compensation modification, or delayed promotion as a 
means of holding officers accountable.180 
                                                                                                                 
 176. See sources cited supra notes 22, 64. For example, the markets can serve in a disciplinary role 
for management conduct. See e.g., Fischel, supra note 64, at 1263–64; Jones, supra note 64, at 116–17 
(discussing the role of employment markets, product markets, and social norms in regulating director 
conduct). 
 177. For purposes of this discussion, efficiency is understood in terms of a minimal loss to 
externalities. 
 178. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142(a) (2006) (stating a corporation “shall have such officers 
with such titles and duties as shall be stated in the bylaws or in a resolution of the board”); MODEL BUS. 
CORP. ACT § 8.40 official cmt. (2006) (permitting “every corporation to designate the offices it wants”); 
id. at § 8.41 (providing that an officer shall perform the duties set forth in the bylaws or prescribed by 
the board). 
 179. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141–42 (2006). 
 180. Johnson & Ricca, supra note 27, at 87 (“With boards of directors controlling most claims against 
officers, we think there will be relatively few lawsuits initiated by directors against officers. We expect 
that most officer misconduct coming to the attention of the board will be resolved as part of an intra-
corporate sanction . . . .”); see also Graf, supra note 28, at 333; Johnson & Millon, supra note 45, at 
1611; Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Mark A. Sides, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Fiduciary Duties, 30 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 1149, 1207–08 (2004). 
  These methods of accountability are exactly the same methods used to police misconduct by 
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As evidenced by several prominent instances of officers being 
disciplined for actions that would amount to a breach of fiduciary 
duty, internal accountability seems to play a meaningful role in 
policing officer conduct. These examples include American 
Apparel’s firing of CEO and founder Dov Charney following 
ongoing investigations into “alleged misconduct”,181 Hewlett-
Packard’s firing of CEO Mark Hurd for improper expenses (and 
related disclosure, accounting and other actions),182 JP Morgan 
Chase’s executive Ina Drew retiring for her role in the London Whale 
fiasco,183 and Walgreen Co.’s termination of chief financial officer 
(CFO) Wade Miquelon following a billion-dollar forecasting error in 
the corporation’s Medicare-related business.184 
It is important to note that these types of internal sanctions can be 
tough for a corporate outsider to measure, which in part lends itself to 
their desirability over litigation.185 Unless a corporation is publicly 
                                                                                                                 
more junior employees, who are also fired when they are detected doing wrong even though, as under 
general principles of agency law, they too have fiduciary duties to the company. Johnson & Millon, 
supra note 45, at 1606 n.27. 
 181. See David Carrig & Gary Strauss, American Apparel Shares Rise after CEO’s Ouster, USA 
TODAY (June 19, 2014, 4:09 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/06/19/ 
american-apparel-ceo-dov-charney-ousted/10835849/. 
 182. See Henry Blodget, Well, There’s No Longer Any Mystery Why HP Fired Mark Hurd, BUS. 
INSIDER (Dec. 30, 2011, 9:14 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/mark-hurd-jodie-fisher-hp-2011-
12; Robert A. Guth et. al., Accuser Said Hurd Leaked an H-P Deal, WALL ST. J (Nov. 6, 2010, 12:01 
AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703805704575594343622319312? 
KEYWORDS=mark+hurd++jodie+fisher&mg=reno64-wsj&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com% 
2Farticle%2FSB10001424052748703805704575594343622319312.html%3FKEYWORDS%3Dmark%
2Bhurd%2B%2Bjodie%2Bfisher. 
 183. See Jim Puzzanghera, Senators to Question Former JPMorgan Exec Who Oversaw London 
Whale, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/mar/13/business/la-fi-mo-
jpmorgan-london-whale-ina-drew-20130313. 
 184. See Michael Siconolfi, Walgreen Shakeup Followed Bad Projection, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 19, 
2014, 9:00 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/walgreen-shakeup-followed-bad-projection-1408494546. 
 185. One area of internal discipline that has attempted to be studied and measured is CEO firing rates. 
See, e.g., Ken Favaro et al., supra note 28, at 2, 11 (finding that boards of operationally involved 
corporations “tend to be more informed and engaged in monitoring strategy”); KEN FAVARO ET AL., 
CEO SUCCESSION REPORT 9 (2011), http://www.strategyand.pwc.com/media/file/Strategyand_CEO-
Succession-Study-2011_Extended-Study-Report.pdf; see also Paredes, supra note 15, at 695. These 
studies have found an increase in CEO turnover rates in the post-Enron era, suggesting that the board of 
directors is playing a more prominent role in holding officers accountable for their conduct. See, e.g., 
ABA REPORT, supra note 6, at 131 (“In 1995, one in eight departing CEOs resigned under board 
pressure or were fired, while in 2006 almost one in three departing CEOs left involuntarily.”) (citations 
omitted); Chuck Lucier et al., supra note 28, at 12 (concluding that boards are “more deeply engaged 
and owners actively involved in governance and strategy”); Kahan & Rock, supra note 9, at 1030–32 
46
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 2
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol32/iss2/2
2016] OFFICER ACCOUNTABILITY 403 
traded and internal disciplinary actions trigger reporting requirements 
under federal securities laws or stock exchange rules, there may be 
no legal obligation to make this information public.186 As a result, 
internal investigations and disciplinary measures can be kept 
relatively private and mitigate any impact on the corporation’s 
reputation and stock price.187 
Another benefit of intra-corporate sanctioning is it can be more 
efficient than filing a lawsuit against a misbehaving officer. In 
contrast to formal litigation, discipline for officer malfeasance can be 
handed down in a relatively quick manner. For example, Walgreens 
forced out its CFO less than a month after his forecasting error was 
brought to the attention of the board.188 Relatedly, internal 
sanctioning of officers avoids many of the costly aspects of litigation 
such as court costs, attorneys’ fees, discovery, and other expenses 
associated with protracted litigation.189 Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, internal methods of accountability do not involve the 
                                                                                                                 
(citing CEO turnover as indicating greater substantive board independence and that CEOs are losing 
their power); Chuck Lucier & Jan Dyer, The Hidden Good News About CEO Dismissals, HARV. BUS. 
REV., July–Aug. 2007, at 1, http://hbr.org/2007/07/the-hidden-good-news-about-ceo-dismissals/ar/1 
(“Worldwide, boards of large corporations are dismissing four times more CEOs today than in 
1995 . . . .”). But see Dammann, supra note 14, at 204 (pointing to executive compensation and golden 
parachutes as other factors that may explain shorter CEO tenure). 
 186. Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of Filing Date, 67 Fed. Reg, 
42914-01 (June 25, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 228, 229, 240, 249) (requiring disclosure of 
certain material corporate events on a current basis, which includes the departure, appointment, and 
compensatory arrangements of certain officers). 
 187. See Whitehead, supra note 17, at 1287 (“Balanced against heightened regulation are the benefits 
of the traditional board-CEO relationship, which remains fundamentally private. There are—for both the 
company and society—important benefits to insulating the CEO from external oversight or universal 
standards.”). 
 188. See Siconolfi, supra note 184. 
 189. But see Brian Breheny, The Landscape of CEO Succession Issues, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. (July 23, 2013), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/07/23/the-
landscape-of-ceo-succession-issues/ (stating that “[i]t is often difficult, time consuming and 
tremendously distracting for a company to even attempt to discharge a CEO for Cause: the standards for 
a showing of Cause are often stringent, and as a result there may be considerable litigation risk”). On the 
other hand, however, it has been found that CEOs forced to leave the corporation were just as likely as 
CEOs who voluntarily departed the corporation to receive excess severance payments, however, the 
fired CEOs tended to receive much more in excess severance payments than the voluntarily leaving 
CEOs. Eitan Goldman & Peggy Huang, Contractual Versus Actual Severance Pay Following CEO 
Departure, July 5, 2010, at 17, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1568156. One 
reason posited for such high excess severance payments for fired CEOs is that it is an effort by the board 
to facilitate a smooth transition from a failed ex-CEO to a new CEO without the ex-CEO making the 
process long and contentious. Id. at 4. 
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complicated and disputable factual question of whether an officer 
actually breached a legal duty. Officers serve at the pleasure of the 
board. When officers do bad things, regardless of whether that 
conduct amounts to a legally cognizable breach of fiduciary duty, the 
board typically has the power and authority to fire them (or use other 
forms of discipline).190 Thus, with more timely discipline of 
misconduct, fewer resources spent on adjudicating and sanctioning 
the breach, and maintenance of the historically private board-officer 
relationship, internal accountability may be a more efficient method 
of policing misconduct by corporate officers than traditional state 
court litigation. 
Alternatively, if one views judicial sanctioning of officers for their 
breaches and recovery of their ill-gotten gains—and the 
commensurate deterrent value of such sanctioning—as the most 
important objective, officer accountability at the federal level may be 
ideal. Federalization of officer accountability has been discussed in 
the context of (i) stockholder federal securities fraud class actions 
and (ii) direct regulation and sanctioning of officer conduct by the 
SEC. 
First, while state fiduciary duty litigation and federal securities 
fraud litigation operate in much the same way in policing corporate 
governance, scholars have concluded that the latter has several 
practical advantages over the former. In their comparison of state and 
federal litigation, Professors Thomson and Sale assert that “state 
fiduciary duty litigation, with its amorphous focus on directors’ 
failure to monitor officers and other parts of the enterprise, is at a 
systematic disadvantage relative to federal law which, in a more 
focused way, seeks to explore what officers need to do to meet their 
corporate disclosure obligations.”191 
                                                                                                                 
 190. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141–142 (2006). Furthermore, the cost to a senior executive of a 
public company of being fired may be tremendous: not only does he or she lose all the future benefits 
under his employment agreement (if the termination is for cause), but his or her personal brand may be 
severely damaged (even if the termination is not for cause), and so his or her future earnings capacity is 
likely substantially reduced. 
 191. Thompson & Sale, supra note 13, at 864. 
48
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 2
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol32/iss2/2
2016] OFFICER ACCOUNTABILITY 405 
Second, the SEC, in contrast to stockholders, is given broad reach, 
both in terms of the substantive law applicable to officers and its 
remedial tools, in holding officers accountable for their actions.192 
The SEC has a broad array of sanctions available to it, including 
restitution, fines, and forward-looking penalties (for example, 
injunctions, cease and desist orders, and barring wrongdoers from 
further service as an officer or director of a reporting company).193 
The SEC is also not subject to the same restrictions as private 
litigants in fraud actions or fiduciary duty actions in seeking to hold 
corporate officers accountable.194 Further, in contrast to intra-
corporate sanctions, both the SEC and private litigants in securities 
actions many times have greater incentives than the board of 
directors to pursue accountability for officer wrongdoing.195 
Third, the personal liability (including the frequency and quantity 
of that liability) associated with penalties at the federal level results 
in private securities litigation and SEC sanctioning having the 
                                                                                                                 
 192. See Langevoort, supra note 174, at 652 (“So far as substantive law is concerned, in fact, what is 
remarkable is the breadth of the SEC’s ability to reach individual corporate executives.”); see also Lisa 
M. Fairfax, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act as Confirmation of Recent Trends in Director and Officer 
Fiduciary Obligations, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 953, 962 (2002); Melissa Maleske, 8 Ways SOX Changed 
Corporate Governance, INSIDE COUNSEL MAGAZINE, at 8 (Jan. 1, 2012), http://www.insidecounsel.com 
/2012/01/01/8-ways-sox-changed-corporate-governance?page=8 (stating that Sarbanes-Oxley 
empowered the SEC by extending the statute of limitations to pursue actions and increased penalties). 
 193. See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 817–20 (5th ed. 
2006); Johnson & Ricca, supra note 27, at 95–97; Langevoort, supra note 174, at 660 (describing the 
remedies available to the SEC). From this perspective, internal accountability would also arguably 
surpass traditional fiduciary duty litigation as well. 
 194. See Langevoort, supra note 174, at 652 (stating that the SEC does not have to meet all of the 
same requirements as private litigants). 
 195. See MYLES L. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY 72–85, 190–94 (rev. ed. 1971) 
(supporting the belief that officers, and not directors, play the central role in corporate affairs); Robert 
W. Hamilton, Corporate Governance in America 1950–2000: Major Changes But Uncertain Benefits, 
25 J. CORP. L. 349, 360–64 (2000); Johnson & Millon, supra note 45, at 1614–17; Myles L. Mace, The 
President and the Board of Directors, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.–Apr. 1972, at 37–43; Steven A. Ramirez, 
The End of Corporate Governance Law: Optimizing Regulatory Structures for a Race to the Top, 24 
YALE J. ON REG. 313, 332 (2007) (“CEOs of public companies have the unique privilege of picking 
their own nominal supervisors—the board of directors.”); Shaner, Restoring the Balance, supra note 3, 
at 28 n.5, 44, 51 (discussing the imbalance in power in corporate management and stating that “[r]ecent 
corporate scandals illustrat[e] that it is the officers, and not the directors, that are at the center of 
managing the business and affairs of the corporation”); Shaner, The (Un)Enforcement, supra note 3, at 
310–11 (discussing how the development of corporate doctrine as well as the dynamic in corporate 
management disincentivizes board oversight and discipline of officer conduct); JAMES B. STEWART, 
DISNEYWAR 531 (2005) (describing how the Disney board members were manipulated by CEO 
Michael Eisner). 
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potential for stronger compensatory and sanctioning components than 
intra-corporate sanctions or state fiduciary duty litigation.196 For 
example, indemnification and director and officer (D&O) insurance 
coverage for SEC enforcement actions are generally unavailable or 
very limited. Many D&O insurance policies do not cover fines, 
penalties and restitution paid to the SEC.197 Similarly, 
indemnification is not generally available for these types of 
sanctions.198 This means that in contrast to private state litigation 
relief, where corporations ultimately bear the costs of a defendant’s 
sanctions by virtue of indemnification or D&O insurance, officers 
must directly bear the cost of the SEC’s sanctions, thereby increasing 
the deterrent value of such accountability. Such strong sanctioning 
can then also have a corresponding strong deterrent effect on future 
officer fiduciary misconduct. Accordingly, if the goal of officer 
accountability is sanctioning of and compensation for officer 
misconduct (along with the deterrent value associated with each of 
these), then accountability at the federal level may be superior to both 
traditional fiduciary duty litigation and intra-corporate actions. 
Lastly, any discussion of the proper or ideal venue for officer 
accountability should include, and this author would contend that it 
should begin with, consideration of the issue from a doctrinal 
development perspective. Currently, there is very little guidance and 
there are many open issues regarding the fiduciary obligations of 
corporate officers. The applicability of the business judgment rule 
and the standard of liability for the duty of care are two such 
examples.199 This is problematic on several levels. Lack of clarity in 
this area of the law leaves officers in the difficult position of having 
to speculate and guess as to what their fiduciary responsibilities 
require of them and what the courts’ expectations will be when 
making decisions in suits against them for failing to comply with 
                                                                                                                 
 196. See Eric Helland, Reputational Penalties and the Merits of Class-Action Securities Litigation, 49 
J.L. & ECON. 365, 365 (2006); Langevoort, supra note 174, at 635–36. 
 197. See Urska Velikonja, Public Compensation for Private Harm: Evidence from the SEC’s Fair 
Fund Distributions, 67 STAN. L. REV. 331, 355–56 (2015). 
 198. See id. at 385 (describing the factors suggesting that corporations do not indemnify officers for 
SEC sanctions, including the SEC policy against allowing indemnification). 
 199. See supra notes 139–42 and accompanying text. 
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those responsibilities.200 Additionally, from the perspectives of 
stockholders’ and boards of directors’, uncertainty as to officer duties 
makes it challenging to know when officers are and, perhaps more 
importantly, are not complying with their duties. This means that 
except in those cases of egregious malfeasance, enforcers of officer 
duties may be hesitant (or even deterred) from seeking judicial relief 
for officer misconduct because the applicable legal principles and 
potential outcome of their lawsuit is largely unclear. This effect finds 
support in (i) the current mix of legal actions against officers, which 
favors claims arising under well-established legal principles like the 
corporate opportunity doctrine, and (ii) court observations that the 
parties failed to raise fiduciary issues.201 
Thus, if one’s objective is the development of judicial doctrine 
regarding officer fiduciary duties, then accountability for officer 
fiduciary obligations would be preferable in the Delaware state court 
context and secondarily in the bankruptcy court context.202 
Adjudication of officer misconduct in these venues would lead to 
much-needed guidance about the contours of officer duties. Indeed, 
scholars have frequently noted the value and broader impact of the 
Delaware courts’ “sermonizing” of the expectations of corporate 
management and best governance practices.203 This kind of guidance 
                                                                                                                 
 200. See also Johnson & Ricca, supra note 27, at 78 n.13, 89 (discussing the lack of legal advice 
provided to officers by their counsel with respect to fiduciary duties). 
 201. See supra Part III.B–C. 
 202. From this perspective then, the least desirable venue for officer accountability would be inside 
the corporation. Intra-corporate accountability results in little to no development of fiduciary duties or 
best practices. 
 203. See, e.g., Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 
UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1016 (1997) (“Delaware courts generate in the first instance the legal standards of 
conduct (which influence the development of the social norms of directors, officers, and lawyers) 
largely through what can best be thought of as ‘corporate law sermons.’”); Myron T. Steele & J.W. 
Verret, Delaware’s Guidance: Ensuring Equity for the Modern Witenagemot, 2 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 
189, 206 (2007) (“The Delaware judges, from their vantage point at the center of the corporate 
governance arena, offer their insights to the community of those who regularly think about best 
practices, and in doing so can help to bring certain questions to the forefront of the collective mind on 
these issues.”); Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 137, at 1404 (“Delaware judges have had a 
substantial role in shaping best practices in corporate governance.”); see generally Chandler & Strine, 
supra note 17, at 977–78 (“Within the framework of fiduciary duty review, the Delaware courts have 
provided strong incentives for corporate boards to use procedures that are designed to protect public 
stockholders.”); Frank v. Elgamal, No. 6120-VCN, 2014 WL 957550, at *20 n. 217 (Del. Ch. Mar. 10, 
2014) (“Extensive literature has developed on the ways in which this Court has encouraged, implicitly 
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would also not be limited to just public corporations, as in the case 
with certain officer accountability at the federal level.204 
Judicial guidance is further beneficial in the area of fiduciary 
duties because of the Delaware courts’ ability to be flexible and 
quickly adapt to changing business conditions and expectations.205 
Two Delaware court judges explain: 
The Delaware approach has tended to create incentives for 
particular good governance practices, yet also recognizes 
that what generally works for most boards may not be the 
best method for some others. The fiduciary duty form of 
accountability is well-suited to this sort of flexibility 
because it is context-specific in application.206 
                                                                                                                 
or explicitly, certain ‘best practices’ of corporate governance.”). 
  In addition, developing fiduciary duties through litigation “performs the task of translating the 
abstract concepts of fiduciary obligation, good faith, and fairness into the specific limits on the insiders’ 
ability to favor themselves.” Davis, supra note 24, at 437. 
 204. C.f. O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 103, at 163 (“Delaware . . . is the preeminent 
American corporate law jurisdiction. More than half of the country’s largest corporations are 
incorporated in that small, mid-Atlantic state.”). 
 205. See In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 951, 960 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“[I]n Delaware’s 
system of corporate law, the adjudication of cases involving the fiduciary duties of directors in new 
business dynamics is one of the most important methods of regulating the internal affairs of 
corporations, as these cases articulate the equitable boundaries that cabin directors’ exercise of their 
capacious statutory authority.”); see generally Fisch, supra note 75, at 1061 (explaining how Delaware 
law largely relies on judicial corporate lawmaking and that the peculiar characteristics and specialization 
of Delaware’s courts play an important role in developing flexible and workable principles). 
 206. Chandler & Strine, supra note 17, at 979; see also Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Veil: Is the 
Common Law the Problem?, 37 CONN. L. REV. 619, 626 (2005) (“One reason that Delaware fiduciary 
duty law is both coherent and adaptive in the classic common law tradition is that it is made by an 
informed group of judges who are repeat players on matters of corporate law. . . . For these chancery 
court judges their experience, both prior to and after becoming judges, gives them an unmatched 
expertise in the field of corporate law.”). 
  Moreover, the Delaware courts have expressed a clear view that oversight of corporate 
fiduciaries is of great importance to Delaware: 
This Court has long recognized Delaware’s strong interest in promptly, 
uniformly, and authoritatively deciding corporate governance disputes of 
Delaware corporations arising, pursuant to the internal affairs doctrine, under 
Delaware law. Depending on the circumstances, this interest, particularly when 
there are breach of fiduciary duty claims, can be so compelling that it may 
‘outweigh the policy underlying the doctrine of comity’ in the Court’s 
determination of whether a stay of a Delaware action in favor of litigation 
elsewhere is appropriate. 
In re Molycorp, Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., No. 7282-VCN, 2014 WL 1891384, at *5 (Del. Ch. 
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Relatedly, in contrast to federal courts, state courts have arguably 
greater availability of resources to dedicate to adjudicating these 
types of corporate governance disputes.207 Accordingly, in thinking 
about the broad goal of increased officer accountability, there should 
be a purposeful focus on the enforcement and accountability scheme 
for officers’ fiduciary duties at the state level. 
CONCLUSION 
Under state law, fiduciary duties are a principal constraint on the 
vast power and authority officers wield in managing their 
corporations. Fiduciary duty litigation thus serves as an important 
mechanism to enforce those duties and counteract the agency costs 
inherent in the centralized management structure of the 
corporation.208 Prior scholarship has assumed that with respect to 
officers, traditional fiduciary duty litigation in the state court context 
                                                                                                                 
May 12, 2014) (internal citations omitted); see also Armstrong v. Pomerance, 423 A.2d 174, 177 (Del. 
1980) (“Delaware [also has] a significant and substantial interest in actively overseeing the conduct of 
those owing fiduciary duties to shareholders of Delaware corporations . . . .”); accord Ryan v. Gifford, 
918 A.2d 341, 349 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“Delaware courts have a significant and substantial interest in 
overseeing the conduct of those owing fiduciary duties to shareholders of Delaware corporations.”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); Carlton Invs. v. TLC Beatrice Int’l Holdings, Inc., No. 13950, 1996 
WL 608492, at *5 (Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 1996) (“[C]laims that a director has breached his fiduciary duties 
to a Delaware corporation are of special concern to this Court.”); cf. ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS 
OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 38–39 (1993) (“The most important transaction-specific asset in the 
chartering relation is an intangible asset, Delaware’s reputation for responsiveness to corporate 
concerns,” which stems from “a comprehensive body of case law, judicial expertise in corporation law, 
and administrative expertise in the rapid processing of corporate filings.”). 
 207. See Chandler & Strine, supra note 17, at 984 n.85. 
 In our experience, the effective adjudication of corporate law disputes 
requires a great deal of direct involvement by the trial judge. The factual records 
in such cases are often large and make for demanding reading. Moreover, many 
of these matters are time-sensitive and involve the application of complex legal 
doctrines to the evidence in a very short timeframe—a reality that limits the 
capacity of judges to delegate very much of the work to law clerks. 
 As we understand it, the federal courts already face a stiff challenge in 
addressing their already formidable caseloads. . . . In view of that reality, it seems 
unlikely that the federal courts are well-positioned to absorb the burden of 
adjudicating corporate governance disputes now handled by state courts. 
Id. 
 208. See Thomas & Thompson, supra note 76, at 1761 (“Shareholder representative litigation is 
different from other forms of representative litigation in large part because of its managerial agency-
cost-reduction characteristics.”); Thompson & Sale, supra note 13, at 903–04 (stating that stockholders 
suits serve as a check on management’s abuse of their position). 
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is not being used to hold officers accountable for violations of their 
duties. As a result, the focus of officer accountability research has 
been in other areas such as federal securities actions, intra-corporate 
sanctioning, and bankruptcy proceedings.209 This article investigates 
the underlying assumption in this scholarship by researching state 
court accountability for officers’ fiduciary duty breaches. 
In an effort to gain additional insight into traditional state court 
fiduciary duty litigation all publicly available Delaware state court 
and bankruptcy court opinions that address officer fiduciary duties 
from 2004 to 2014 were collected and considered. The results of this 
research provide an initial picture of the officer accountability 
landscape that is consistent with prior hypotheses. First, only a 
modest number of opinions that discuss or reference claims against 
officers for fiduciary duty breaches were found, supporting prior 
beliefs that these individuals are infrequently being held accountable 
for their breaches of fiduciary duty in state court. Second, as scholars 
have contended, stockholders play the lead role in using litigation to 
enforce officer fiduciary duties. Finally, the opinions collected are 
consistent with assertions that (i) fiduciary duty claims largely focus 
on duty of loyalty (as opposed to care) violations and (ii) the 
procedural hurdles in derivative litigation seem to impede the 
enforcement of officer fiduciary duties. 
What further emerges from the opinions collected is that officer 
fiduciary duty doctrine is an area of corporate law that has been, and 
is continuing to be, developed at a very slow pace.210 Superficial use 
of precedent, judicial restraint, and reliance on established legal 
principles are all contributing to a stalling in the development of the 
courts’ jurisprudence. The irony of this situation is there is a strong 
demand for guidance as to officers’ fiduciary obligations and best 
practices because of the leading role officers play in corporate 
governance, yet the ones who largely drive the development of 
fiduciary doctrine (i.e., plaintiffs) are failing to raise these issues 
                                                                                                                 
 209. See supra notes 26–28 and accompanying text. 
 210. See supra note 149–152 and accompanying text. 
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before the courts.211 Indeed, the Delaware courts themselves have 
acknowledged that there are important open issues relating to 
officers, extending invitations to plaintiffs to raise these matters so 
that the court may fully address them.212 A synthesis of what the 
court has said about officer duties thus far indicates that, essentially, 
the standards of conduct for officer fiduciary duties are largely the 
same as directors.213 In contrast, it is less clear that this will be the 
case with respect to the applicable standards of review for those 
duties. In the absence of judicial guidance, there are strong arguments 
for why the standards of review for officer actions should, in fact, be 
different from those of directors.214 
Finally, the call for further clarity in officer fiduciary duty doctrine 
directly bears on the broader discussion of the current system of 
checks and balances on officer conduct, specifically the appropriate 
bases for officer liability for breaches of fiduciary duty and the 
context in which it should occur. While intra-corporate sanctioning, 
private federal securities actions, and SEC actions may be preferable 
from a corporate efficiency or a sanctioning or deterrent perspective, 
these fora do not noticeably aid in the development of the contours of 
officer fiduciary duties.215 Rather, the importance of the role of state 
court fiduciary duty litigation in shaping those duties, best 
governance practices, and the expectations of corporate management 
has been widely recognized.216 When these factors are taken into 
account, fiduciary accountability in the state court context is vital to 
an effective system of checks and balances on officer behavior and 
                                                                                                                 
 211. See Cheffins et al., supra note 62, at 432 (noting how the plaintiffs’ bar shapes corporate law); 
Johnson & Ricca, supra note 27, at 76 n.3; Thompson & Sale, supra note 13, at 864 (“In reality, officers 
exercise the most important corporate powers, but in legal theory they are clearly subordinate to the 
board and are barely mentioned in most corporations statutes.”). 
 212. See supra note 149 & 154 and accompanying text. 
 213. See supra notes 126–129 and accompanying text. 
 214. Compare Johnson, supra note 100, at 440 (arguing that the business judgment rule does not 
apply), with Hamermesh & Sparks, supra note 100, at 865 (asserting that the business judgment rule 
should apply). 
 215. See supra Part IV (discussing the different venues officer accountability can occur in and the 
benefits and detriments of each). 
 216. See supra note 203 and accompanying text. 
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should be at the forefront of discussions to improve corporate 
governance. 
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